As a 14-day ceasefire between Iran and Israel nears expiration in May 2026, a stark gap has emerged between what weeks of Israeli and American airstrikes have destroyed and what Iran can still fire back. Israeli military leaders say they have wiped out a majority of Iran’s missile launchers and roughly 80 percent of its air defenses. But by their own admission, the threat is far from over. The estimate that Iran retains approximately 70 percent of its ballistic missile stockpile has circulated among Western defense officials and regional analysts, though no named source or declassified document has publicly confirmed that precise figure. Much of the surviving arsenal is believed to be stored in hardened underground bunkers and mounted on mobile launchers that have so far evaded targeting.
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who also serves as Tehran’s chief negotiator, sharpened the stakes in remarks to reporters in May 2026, though the exact date, venue, and outlet have not been independently confirmed. “We have been preparing to reveal new cards on the battlefield,” Ghalibaf said, a warning that landed just as diplomatic talks in Islamabad failed to produce any visible progress toward extending or replacing the truce.
The damage so far, and its limits
The most detailed public damage assessment has come from the officer identified in Israeli briefings as Chief of General Staff Eyal Zamir. (Note: This name has not been independently verified against confirmed IDF leadership as of May 2026; the most recently confirmed holder of the post in public records was Herzi Halevi.) According to those briefings, Israeli forces destroyed a majority of Iran’s missile launchers along with 80 percent of its air defense network. Those are significant losses. But the same briefings included a qualifier that cut against any victory narrative: “The threat has not yet been removed.”
The reason is straightforward. Launchers are not the same as missiles. Iran’s ballistic arsenal is dispersed across hardened underground facilities, mobile transporter-erector-launchers that can relocate within hours, and stockpiles spread across the country’s vast interior. Destroying a launcher on the surface does not eliminate the warheads stored beneath a mountain. Western defense officials have pointed to this distinction as the basis for estimates that Iran retains around 70 percent of its overall missile capability, though no single named official has confirmed that precise figure on the record and no declassified document supporting it has been released publicly.
Iran has not published its own accounting of surviving assets, and independent verification is effectively impossible given the secrecy surrounding both sides’ operations. What is clear is that the Israeli and American campaign, while degrading Iran’s ability to launch coordinated salvos, has not produced the kind of disarmament that would take Iranian retaliation off the table.
Ghalibaf’s warning and the Islamabad impasse
Ghalibaf’s “new cards” language was carefully chosen. Iranian leaders have a long history of using vague escalatory rhetoric to signal resolve without locking themselves into specific commitments. The phrase could refer to missile systems held in reserve, activation of proxy networks across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, or unconventional tactics designed to raise the cost of further strikes without triggering a full-scale war.
What it almost certainly reflects is a domestic political calculation as well. Ghalibaf, a former Revolutionary Guard commander with presidential ambitions, has reason to project strength at a moment when Iranian citizens are absorbing the reality of sustained foreign strikes on their soil. His audience is not only Washington and Tel Aviv but also Tehran.
Meanwhile, the Islamabad talks have produced nothing concrete that either side has been willing to put on the record. No communique, no framework, no confirmed extension of the ceasefire. The identity of mediating parties and the specific terms under discussion remain opaque. Pakistan has positioned itself as a neutral venue, but back-channel diplomacy in this region has a long track record of stalling without resolution, and there is no public evidence that these contacts have moved beyond exploratory stages.
Washington’s open hand and clenched fist
In the United States, Congress has removed one potential brake on escalation. Both the House and Senate voted down a war powers resolution that would have required the administration to halt military operations against Iran. No specific date or legislative reference for these votes has been independently confirmed. That outcome does not guarantee further strikes, but it gives the White House broad authority to resume or expand them once the truce lapses.
President Trump has sent contradictory signals about what comes next. Some public remarks have emphasized a preference for a deal and a desire to avoid a broader regional conflict. Others have stressed military readiness and a willingness to hit Iran harder if provocations continue. The inconsistency could reflect genuine internal debate within the administration, a deliberate strategy to keep Tehran guessing, or simply the absence of a finalized plan. Allies in the Gulf and Europe have privately expressed frustration at the ambiguity, according to diplomats who spoke to reporters on condition of anonymity.
The practical effect is that no one outside a small circle in Washington knows whether the days after the ceasefire expires will bring renewed diplomacy or renewed bombing. And that uncertainty is itself a destabilizing force, pushing regional actors to hedge, stockpile, and prepare for the worst.
Why the ceasefire deadline reshapes the entire conflict
The most reliable signal of where this conflict is headed will not come from press conferences or parliamentary speeches. It will come from what happens on the ground once the truce window closes.
If the ceasefire is extended, even informally, it will indicate that both sides have concluded the risks of renewed fighting outweigh the potential gains. If strikes resume, the critical question becomes one of scale. A limited exchange targeting military infrastructure on both sides could be absorbed without spiraling further, particularly if neither side hits population centers or energy infrastructure. But a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities or senior leadership, or an Iranian attack on Israeli cities or American bases in the region, would carry a far higher risk of pulling the entire Middle East into open conflict.
For now, the 70 percent figure, even as an unconfirmed estimate, stands as the most consequential number in this crisis. It is a reminder that Iran’s missile force, while damaged, remains a credible threat. It shapes the calculus in Washington, where planners must weigh whether further strikes can meaningfully reduce that arsenal or will simply provoke the retaliation they are meant to prevent. And it hangs over the diplomats in Islamabad, who know that every day without an agreement is a day closer to finding out what Ghalibaf’s “new cards” actually look like.
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*This article was researched with the help of AI, with human editors creating the final content.
