Morning Overview

US Navy wants anti-radiation missile that can hunt and kill airborne radars

The Naval Air Systems Command, known as NAVAIR, is conducting market research for a weapon it calls the Advanced Emission Suppression Missile with Enhanced Capabilities, or AESM. In a sources sought notice posted on the federal government’s contract portal, NAVAIR describes a requirement for a missile intended to engage radar emitters on the ground and in the air. The posting indicates the Navy is exploring a purpose-built approach to counter radar-emitting airborne platforms as well as traditional ground-based emitters.

What NAVAIR Is Asking Industry to Build

Traditional anti-radiation missiles home in on ground-based radar installations, such as surface-to-air missile guidance systems and coastal surveillance arrays. The AESM program breaks from that pattern. According to the sources sought notice on the government’s System for Award Management, the weapon must have the ability to engage both air-to-air and air-to-ground targets. That dual-role requirement means a single missile could suppress a ground-based air defense radar in one sortie and then, on the next, target an airborne early-warning aircraft broadcasting its own powerful radar signal hundreds of miles from the fight.

The notice also specifies that the AESM must deliver longer range than the current Navy inventory. While the document does not name the existing system it intends to surpass, the Navy has long fielded anti-radiation missiles such as the AGM-88 family. Extending range beyond those platforms would allow launch aircraft to stay farther from enemy air defenses during suppression missions, reducing the risk to both the crew and the airframe. Longer reach would also give commanders more flexibility to prosecute emitters located deep inside contested airspace, where traditional standoff weapons might struggle to survive dense layers of defensive fire.

Why Airborne Radars Now Demand a Dedicated Killer

The emphasis on engaging airborne radiating targets reflects a shift in the threat environment. Modern adversary air forces operate large airborne early-warning and control aircraft that can detect carrier strike group movements and direct fighter intercepts from well beyond the reach of ship-based defenses. Destroying or forcing those platforms off station would blind an opponent’s kill chain at a critical node, degrading their ability to coordinate attacks against Navy surface ships and aircraft. The notice’s emphasis on engaging airborne radiating targets suggests the Navy wants a more direct way to hold radar-emitting aircraft at risk in flight, not just ground-based emitters.

A missile that can autonomously track a moving airborne emitter poses engineering challenges distinct from those of a ground-attack anti-radiation weapon. Ground radars are stationary or slow-moving, allowing a seeker to lock onto a fixed position even if the radar shuts down briefly. An airborne target, by contrast, can maneuver, change altitude, and vary its radar emissions to complicate the missile’s guidance solution. The AESM seeker would likely need advanced signal processing, possibly aided by onboard algorithms capable of classifying and re-acquiring a target in a dense electronic warfare environment. The contract opportunity listing does not detail specific seeker technology, but the operational requirement itself implies a significant step beyond current anti-radiation guidance systems.

Reading Between the Lines of a Market Research Notice

The AESM posting is classified as a sources sought notice, which in federal procurement language means NAVAIR is not yet awarding a contract. Instead, the command is surveying the defense industrial base to identify companies with the technology, production capacity, and engineering expertise to meet the requirement. This stage of the acquisition process often precedes a formal request for proposals by months or even years. It gives the government a clearer picture of what is technically feasible and at what cost before committing funds. For the defense industry, it is an invitation to pitch capabilities and shape the eventual program requirements, including potential trade-offs among range, seeker sophistication, and integration timelines.

That said, publishing a sources sought notice is often an early indicator that a requirement is being defined and that the government is testing what industry can provide. The dual-role specification and the explicit call for longer range suggest that internal Navy studies have already identified the operational need and defined at least preliminary performance thresholds. What remains unknown from the public record is the projected timeline for prototype testing, the anticipated unit cost, and which aircraft platforms would carry the weapon. NAVAIR has not released public statements elaborating on those details, and the notice itself is deliberately broad to encourage the widest possible industry response, including from nontraditional suppliers that may bring novel seeker or propulsion concepts.

Tracking Defense Spending in a Shifting Data Environment

Monitoring how much money eventually flows into the AESM program will require attention to where the government publishes its contract records. The federal procurement data system known as FPDS.gov is scheduled to decommission on February 24, 2026, with all search functions migrating to SAM.gov. That transition consolidates contract award data, spending records, and opportunity listings under a single portal, which should simplify public tracking of programs like AESM once contracts are awarded. Researchers and journalists who previously relied on FPDS.gov’s separate search tools will need to adjust their methods accordingly, learning the new interface and filters to reconstruct a clear picture of Navy missile procurement.

Federal spending records available through USAspending.gov offer another lens for following Navy missile investments over time. USAspending.gov captures obligations across all defense accounts and can reveal funding patterns once the program moves from market research to active development, including any future AESM-related awards that are reported there. Analysts can compare AESM-related obligations to other munitions programs to see how the Navy prioritizes offensive electronic attack relative to more traditional missiles. For taxpayers and oversight bodies, these tools represent the primary means of verifying that defense dollars align with stated priorities, especially as new capabilities like AESM compete for finite resources within broader modernization plans.

A Bet on Offensive Electronic Attack

The AESM program, if it advances to production, would represent a philosophical shift in how the Navy approaches electronic warfare. For years, the service has invested heavily in defensive electronic countermeasures, such as jamming pods and decoys that protect friendly aircraft and ships from radar-guided threats. A missile designed to physically destroy the radar source, whether it sits on a hilltop or flies at altitude, is an offensive tool that removes the threat rather than merely degrading it. That distinction matters in a conflict scenario where jamming power is finite and an adversary can cycle through backup frequencies or activate redundant emitters. By contrast, a successful AESM shot against a key radar aircraft or ground node could create a window of relative freedom for carrier air wings to maneuver and strike without facing a fully integrated air defense network.

Seen in that light, AESM is not just another missile but a bet on shaping the electromagnetic battlespace as aggressively as the physical one. If NAVAIR and its industry partners can overcome the technical hurdles of tracking agile airborne emitters at long range, the Navy would gain a specialized instrument for dismantling an opponent’s sensing architecture. That prospect helps explain why the service is probing industry now, before a crisis forces rushed improvisation. The market research notice does not guarantee AESM will become a fielded weapon, but it marks a clear intent to explore a future in which offensive electronic attack is waged not only with invisible waves of jamming energy, but also with missiles built to home on the very emissions that make modern militaries so lethal.

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*This article was researched with the help of AI, with human editors creating the final content.