The United States has accused China of conducting a covert nuclear explosive test in 2020, a charge that lands at a moment when the last major arms control agreements are fraying. The allegation, leveled by Washington’s top nuclear envoy, collides with denials from Beijing and a public finding from the global test-ban monitor that it has seen no evidence of a blast. I see the clash as less about a single disputed event and more about a shifting nuclear order in which old rules are eroding faster than new ones can be written.
The explosive allegation at Lop Nur
At the center of the dispute is a claim by The United States that China of carried out an undisclosed nuclear detonation in 2020 at its Lop Nur test site, using techniques designed to conceal the blast from international monitoring. According to detailed accounts, the United States’ top nuclear arms official on Friday said the test was part of a broader pattern in which China of has allegedly prepared for and conducted nuclear explosive tests while employing systems to mask prior detonations, a charge that raises questions about Beijing’s adherence to the global testing moratorium and is laid out in National Security reporting. The same official framed the alleged 2020 detonation as evidence that China is not simply modernizing its arsenal on paper but actively experimenting with warhead designs and delivery systems, a point underscored in a separate description of how The United States’ top nuclear arms official on Friday accused China of carrying out an undisclosed nuclear detonation in 2020, as detailed in The United States account.
The allegation was delivered in a high-profile diplomatic setting, not a quiet intelligence briefing, which signals that Washington wanted the charge to reverberate globally. In Geneva, Under Secretary Thomas, speaking in formal Remarks to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland, tied the alleged 2020 test to a broader narrative of Chinese nuclear expansion and opacity, a linkage that appears in the official Remarks. U.S. officials have also briefed that China is on track to field roughly 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, a projection that was highlighted when DiNanno said China had conducted tests and was rapidly expanding its arsenal toward 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, as reported in DiNanno said. For Washington, the alleged covert test is both a technical concern and a political tool to argue that China’s nuclear rise is happening outside any binding constraints.
China’s denial and the test-ban monitor’s pushback
Beijing has rejected the accusation outright, casting itself as a responsible nuclear power and accusing Washington of manufacturing a crisis to justify new pressure. Chinese officials have described the claim as “groundless,” insisted that China complies with its testing moratorium, and argued that the United States for is the one undermining stability by expanding missile defenses and modernizing its own arsenal, a countercharge captured in coverage that notes China dismissed the accusations, described itself as a responsible nuclear nation, and blamed the United States for triggering an arms race, as reflected in China dismissed. In that telling, the United States is using an unproven allegation to rally allies and justify folding China into a new arms control framework on terms set in Washington.
Adding to the complexity, the body that runs the global nuclear test monitoring system has publicly said it has no evidence to support the U.S. claim. Robert Floyd, the executive secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, has explained that the organization’s network of sensors did not detect a nuclear blast consistent with the alleged 2020 event, a point that appears in accounts quoting Robert Floyd, executive secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, who said the monitoring system had not registered such a test, as reported in Robert Floyd. Another detailed account notes that there is no evidence to support the U.S. claim that China conducted a nuclear blast test and that Washington wants Beijing to join a new nuclear weapons treaty after expiration of the New START accord between the US and Russia, as described in no evidence. That public divergence between U.S. intelligence assessments and the test-ban monitor’s data gives Beijing diplomatic cover and complicates Washington’s effort to build a coalition around its charge.
New START’s collapse and a vacuum in the rules
The timing of the allegation is not accidental. It comes just as The New START treaty, the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between Russia and the United States, has expired, removing the only legally binding cap on the two largest arsenals, a development described in detail in coverage that notes The New START treaty was the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between Russia and the United States and has now lapsed, as summarized in New START. President Trump has made clear he did not want to simply roll over a “badly negotiated” pact, saying, “Rather than extend ‘NEW START’ (A badly negotiated deal by the United States that, aside from everything else, is being grossly violated by Russia), we will seek a better, improved, and modernized pact,” a position laid out in his comment that “Rather than extend ‘NEW START’ (A badly negotiated deal by the United States that, aside from everything else, is being grossly violated by Russia), we will seek a better, improved, and modernized pact,” as quoted in Rather. In Geneva, Under Secretary Thomas explicitly warned that without New START’s terms, both Russia and the United States are now unconstrained in how far they can expand their deployed strategic forces, a warning embedded in his statement that the United States and Russia are now unconstrained by New START’s terms, as recorded in the official As Delivered text.
Russian and U.S. negotiators have acknowledged the danger. In MOSCOW, Russian and U.S. negotiators discussed the expiration of the last remaining nuclear arms pact between the two countries and agreed that a quick new agreement was needed, a rare point of consensus captured in reports that Russian and U.S. negotiators discussed the expiration of the last remaining nuclear arms pact between the two countries and agreed that a quick new agreement was needed, as described in MOSCOW. Another account notes that Russian and U.S. negotiators discussed the expiration of the last remaining nuclear arms pact between the two countries and agreed that the world would be less safe without a replacement, as reported in Russian and. Yet those same negotiators are now operating in a landscape where Washington is publicly accusing China of secret testing and where the annual US compliance report has previously assessed that Russia has failed to maintain its testing moratorium, a charge that “the annual US compliance report has previously assessed that Russia has failed to maintain its testing moratorium,” as noted in Russia. The result is a three-way trust deficit at the very moment a new framework is most needed.
Washington’s push for a three-way treaty
For President Trump, the alleged Chinese test is also leverage. Washington wants Beijing to join a new nuclear weapons treaty after expiration of the New START accord between the US and Russia, a strategic goal spelled out in reporting that Washington wants Beijing to join a new nuclear weapons treaty after expiration of the New START accord between the US and Russia, as detailed in Washington wants. The administration has argued that any future framework must cover not only deployed strategic warheads but also newer systems and the growing arsenals of China and, potentially, other nuclear states. One detailed account notes that Getting your Trinity Audio player ready, the New START treaty, the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between Russia and the United States, has expired and that Washington now wants a broader deal that would include Chinese systems that were never covered by New START, as described in Getting. In that sense, the allegation of a covert test is being used to argue that China cannot be left outside the next generation of arms control rules.
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*This article was researched with the help of AI, with human editors creating the final content.
