Ukraine’s National Guard Commander Oleksandr Pivnenko has warned that Russian forces are increasingly substituting drones for ground troops, a tactical shift he says compensates for heavy infantry losses and reshapes how Moscow wages its war. The assessment, drawn from a direct interview with the senior commander, points to a battlefield where unmanned systems now fill roles once reserved for soldiers, raising the stakes of a technology race that neither side can afford to lose.
Small Groups, Big Cover From Above
Russian troops have moved away from massing infantry for assaults and instead operate in small groups, according to Pivnenko’s account. In his description, these units are now “relying on drones to provide cover” rather than exposing larger formations to Ukrainian fire. The drones help Russian troops identify and attack Ukrainian positions, effectively performing reconnaissance and fire-support tasks that would otherwise require additional soldiers on the ground.
This is not simply a matter of preference. Russia has sustained significant infantry attrition since the full-scale invasion began, and the shift toward drone-augmented small units suggests Moscow is adapting out of necessity rather than doctrinal ambition. By pairing a handful of soldiers with overhead surveillance and strike capability, Russian commanders can maintain pressure along broad sections of the front without committing the manpower reserves they may no longer have in sufficient numbers. Pivnenko’s call for Ukraine to field more drones and refine its own tactics reflects a recognition that this approach is working well enough to demand a direct counter.
The reliance on drones also changes how engagements unfold at the squad and platoon level. Instead of advancing blindly into prepared defenses, Russian teams can send quadcopters ahead to spot ambushes, map trench lines, and cue artillery or loitering munitions. For Ukrainian defenders, that means concealment and mobility are harder to maintain, and any movement near the front risks rapid detection from above.
Scale of Russia’s Drone Offensives
The tactical picture Pivnenko describes is matched by the sheer volume of Russian drone attacks at the strategic level. Ukraine’s air force reported that Russia fired nearly 400 long-range drones in a single wave, a barrage linked to signs that a spring offensive had begun. That kind of saturation attack serves a dual purpose: it degrades Ukrainian air defenses and critical infrastructure while simultaneously intensifying ground pressure along the front lines.
The connection between drone barrages and ground operations is direct. Large-scale drone strikes force Ukraine to divert interceptors, radar attention, and command bandwidth away from the contact line. When those resources are stretched thin, the small Russian infantry groups Pivnenko described face less resistance as they probe for weak points. The combination of strategic drone salvos and tactical drone cover creates layered pressure that is difficult to counter with finite defensive assets.
Repeated mass strikes also test Ukraine’s industrial and logistical resilience. Every intercept consumes expensive missiles, ammunition, and spare parts, while the attacking drones are comparatively cheap and can be produced in large numbers. Over time, that imbalance can erode Ukraine’s ability to protect both cities and troops unless it can field lower-cost defensive systems and expand domestic production.
Ukraine’s Counterpunch at Kupyansk
Ukraine has shown it can turn the drone equation in its favor when it concentrates the right mix of forces. In the northeastern city of Kupyansk, Ukrainian command urgently shifted attention to the area and deployed specialized drone and infantry units, wresting back the initiative from Russian forces that had been making gains.
Kupyansk offers a practical lesson in how drone-infantry integration works on the Ukrainian side. Rather than simply matching Russia drone for drone, the Ukrainian approach combined unmanned systems with coordinated ground maneuver, allowing smaller defending forces to identify, fix, and strike advancing Russian units before they could consolidate positions. Drone operators provided real-time video to commanders, who could then direct artillery, mortars, or small assault groups onto exposed Russian elements.
The success there, however, required pulling specialized assets from other sectors, highlighting a persistent resource dilemma: Ukraine cannot replicate that formula everywhere at once. Concentrating elite drone operators and well-equipped infantry in one threatened area inevitably leaves other stretches of the front with more basic capabilities. Kyiv’s commanders are therefore forced into constant triage, deciding where to surge scarce drones, operators, and electronic-warfare teams to blunt the most dangerous Russian pushes.
Drones Now Dominate Target Destruction
The broader pattern extends well beyond any single battle. Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi, Ukraine’s unmanned-systems commander, has stated that drones now dominate target destruction on the modern battlefield. He also warned that NATO armies are unprepared for the kind of drone warfare playing out in Ukraine, pointing to an evolution of tactics that conventional Western militaries have yet to absorb into their own planning.
That warning carries weight beyond the Ukrainian front. If relatively inexpensive drones can substitute for infantry, suppress enemy positions, and deliver precision strikes at scale, the cost calculus of ground warfare shifts dramatically. Armies built around armored brigades and large infantry formations face a future where a fraction of those forces, paired with swarms of unmanned systems, could achieve comparable or greater effects. The war in Ukraine is generating real-time data on that transition, and Sukharevskyi’s point is that most NATO members have not yet fully internalized the implications for training, procurement, and doctrine.
For Ukraine, drones have become central not only to attack but also to survivability. Units at the front often rely on small quadcopters to scout safe routes, check for mines, and monitor enemy artillery positions. Losing that aerial picture can quickly translate into higher casualties, reinforcing the sense among Ukrainian commanders that drones are no longer a niche capability but a basic necessity, comparable to radios or armored vehicles.
AI Sharpens the Drone Edge
Both sides are now layering artificial intelligence onto their drone operations to gain an advantage. Ukrainian drone pilots use AI-assisted targeting to overcome electronic warfare and jamming, allowing them to strike targets at longer ranges of around 20 kilometers. Russia has deployed similar AI technology, setting up an escalating cycle where each side’s countermeasures drive the other toward more autonomous systems.
The AI component matters because it addresses one of the biggest vulnerabilities drones face: electronic jamming. Without advanced onboard guidance, a jammed drone loses its link to the operator and either crashes or drifts off course. With AI-enabled navigation and vision systems, the drone can lock onto a preselected target, follow terrain, and continue its approach even after the control signal is severed.
That capability changes the math for both offense and defense. For Russia, it means drone-supported small units can operate effectively even when Ukraine deploys sophisticated electronic countermeasures. For Ukraine, it means its own strike drones can reach deeper behind Russian lines to hit logistics hubs, command posts, and air-defense radars. As autonomy increases, the time window for defenders to detect, identify, and neutralize incoming drones narrows, placing a premium on faster sensors and automated response systems.
Interceptor Drones as a Defensive Answer
Ukraine’s top military leadership is responding to the growing drone threat by pushing for new layers of active defense. Commanders have urged allies to support the development and deployment of dedicated interceptor drones that can hunt and destroy enemy unmanned aircraft before they reach their targets. Unlike traditional air-defense missiles, these interceptors can be cheaper, reusable in some configurations, and more flexible against small, low-flying threats.
Interceptor drones are designed to patrol likely approach routes, detect hostile aircraft using onboard sensors or networked radar feeds, and then ram or disable them with specialized munitions or nets. Deployed in sufficient numbers, they could thin out incoming swarms and reduce the burden on expensive surface-to-air systems that are better suited to cruise missiles and larger aircraft.
However, building an effective interceptor fleet poses its own challenges. Ukraine needs reliable communications links, robust software to distinguish friend from foe in crowded airspace, and enough manufacturing capacity to replace losses. Training operators and integrating these systems into existing air-defense networks will take time, even as Russian drone attacks continue at high tempo.
A War Redefined From Above
Pivnenko’s warning that Russia is substituting drones for infantry crystallizes a broader transformation in how the war is being fought. Small assault groups now rely on constant coverage from the sky; large-scale barrages of long-range drones shape the strategic environment; AI-enabled systems push past jamming; and Ukraine experiments with interceptor drones to claw back control of its airspace.
For Ukraine, staying in the fight means not only matching Russian innovation but trying to stay half a step ahead, fielding more drones, integrating them more tightly with ground forces, and building defenses that can cope with mass, autonomy, and speed. For NATO capitals watching from afar, the message from Ukrainian commanders is equally stark: the era of drone-dominated warfare has already arrived, and armies that fail to adapt risk discovering that their traditional strengths no longer guarantee an edge on tomorrow’s battlefields.
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*This article was researched with the help of AI, with human editors creating the final content.
