When federal agents raided a reporter’s home in 2023, they walked out with an iPhone they could not crack, because it was already running Lockdown Mode. That single detail has turned an obscure Apple setting into a flashpoint in the long fight between device privacy and government access, often framed as the “Going Dark” debate. Apple first rolled out Lockdown Mode with iOS 16 on September 12, 2022, and the feature now sits at the center of a court fight over whether even the FBI can get past it, raising urgent questions for journalists, activists, and anyone facing sophisticated digital threats.
What is iPhone Lockdown Mode and When Was It Introduced?
Apple describes Lockdown Mode as an extreme protection setting designed for the small number of users who face “rare and highly sophisticated cyber attacks,” including mercenary spyware. According to Apple, Lockdown Mode sharply limits the ways an iPhone can be reached from the outside, including blocking most message attachments and link previews, restricting incoming FaceTime calls, and tightening rules around wired connections and configuration profiles. The company frames it as a defense against the sort of targeted campaigns associated with commercial surveillance tools rather than a general privacy toggle for everyday use.
The feature arrived as part of Apple’s broader security push with iOS 16, which launched on September 12, 2022, and is available on supported iPhones, iPads, and Macs running that software or later. Reporting on the Lockdown Mode rollout notes that Apple explicitly tied it to the threat of mercenary spyware and positioned it as a last-resort shield rather than a default setting. In practice, that means it is built for people who believe they may be singled out by powerful adversaries, not for casual users looking to block ads or hide from routine tracking.
The FBI “Going Dark” Challenge and Lockdown Mode’s Role
For years the FBI has warned that strong encryption can leave investigators “Going Dark,” unable to access digital evidence even with a warrant. In formal testimony on Going Dark, encryption technology and the balances between public safety and privacy, the FBI described how locked devices and end-to-end encrypted services can obstruct investigations into serious crimes. The bureau has argued that this trend complicates efforts to gather lawfully authorized data, framing the issue as a clash between device security and the ability to protect the public.
Earlier FBI testimony on Going Dark, are technology, privacy, and public safety on a collision course stressed that the agency does not necessarily seek a simple “back door” but wants some form of lawful access that does not, in its view, undermine overall security. In those remarks, FBI leadership highlighted the tension between protecting individuals from cyber threats and enabling investigators to reach critical evidence. Lockdown Mode sits squarely in that tension: it is intentionally designed to harden an iPhone to the point that even a sophisticated actor, including law enforcement, may be locked out.
Real-World Evidence: How Lockdown Mode Foiled the FBI
The abstract “Going Dark” debate became concrete in the Natanson case, which centers on a 2023 FBI raid on a reporter’s home. According to court documents described by the Associated Press, agents seized an iPhone that was already in Lockdown Mode and later told the court they were unable to access its contents. That detail has been cited in filings in Natanson v. Apple as evidence that Apple’s most aggressive security setting can stop even a determined federal investigation from getting inside a device.
Coverage that draws from the Natanson record, including analysis summarized by Major reporting on Lockdown Mode and the case, notes that the FBI’s difficulty stemmed from the combination of Apple’s encryption and the extra restrictions Lockdown Mode layers on top. A separate Associated Press account ties the same incident to broader questions about how far device makers should go in shielding users from intrusion. In that light, the Natanson filing is not just about one phone, but about whether Apple’s design choices can effectively place some data outside the FBI’s reach.
Step-by-Step Guide to Enable Lockdown Mode
Apple’s own instructions make turning on Lockdown Mode relatively straightforward, even if the company warns that it is intended for high-risk situations. On an iPhone running iOS 16 or later, users are told to open Settings, tap Privacy & Security, scroll down to Lockdown Mode, then tap Turn On Lockdown Mode. After reading a summary of what will change, the user confirms by tapping Turn On & Restart, which reboots the device with the stricter protections in place. Apple’s documentation stresses that this applies across built-in apps and affects how the device handles incoming content.
Guides that walk through the process, including coverage cited in reputable explainers on Lockdown Mode, emphasize that the setting is available on modern Apple hardware running iOS 16 or later and similar versions of iPadOS and macOS. Those explainers also recommend that users think carefully before enabling it, because it can interfere with routine communication and browsing. Once enabled, the same Settings menu lets users turn Lockdown Mode off again, restoring normal behavior after another restart.
What Lockdown Mode Disables and Its Limitations
Apple’s official explainer lists a series of concrete restrictions that Lockdown Mode imposes. In Messages, most attachment types other than images are blocked, and link previews are disabled to prevent hidden code from executing. In FaceTime, incoming calls are limited to people the user has previously contacted. Web browsing is also tightened, with some complex web technologies and fonts blocked, which can cause certain sites to load incorrectly or not at all. Wired connections to a computer or accessory are limited when the device is locked, and configuration profiles, which can deeply change system settings, are also restricted.
Reporting that evaluates the feature’s impact, such as reputable coverage of Lockdown Mode, stresses that these protections come with real trade-offs. Everyday tasks like opening document attachments, clicking rich links, or joining unexpected video calls can become frustrating, and some websites may appear broken. Analysts quoted in that coverage point out that Lockdown Mode is not a magic shield against every possible attack and does not guarantee safety if an attacker already controls a user’s accounts or has physical access and passcodes. Instead, it sharply narrows the attack surface for remote, sophisticated exploits, which is valuable but not absolute.
Why It Matters Now: Balancing Privacy and Security
The rise of mercenary spyware such as Pegasus, which has been linked to surveillance of journalists and activists, is the backdrop for Apple’s decision to introduce Lockdown Mode. In its description of the feature, Apple explicitly names “mercenary spyware” and “rare and highly sophisticated cyber attacks” as the threats it is trying to blunt. Reporting that connects Lockdown Mode to the Natanson court filing notes that Apple has framed the mode as part of a broader human-rights and safety effort, particularly for people whose work or identity puts them in the crosshairs of powerful adversaries. The fact that the FBI could not access a phone protected this way underscores how far Apple has gone in that direction.
At the same time, the FBI’s Going Dark testimony keeps the public-safety side of the ledger in view. In those remarks, FBI leadership argued that unbreakable encryption can hide evidence in cases involving violent crime and national security, and raised the question of how society should balance individual privacy with the need to investigate serious offenses. Lockdown Mode intensifies that debate by making it even harder to reach data on some devices, even when agents obtain a warrant. The Natanson case gives that tension a human face, because it involves a reporter whose work may depend on protecting confidential sources.
Is Lockdown Mode Right for You?
Security analysts quoted in Associated Press coverage of Lockdown Mode generally agree that most people will never need this level of protection. For an average user, the inconveniences, from blocked attachments to broken websites, may outweigh the benefits. Those experts point instead to basic steps like strong passcodes, software updates, and cautious handling of links and attachments as more practical first lines of defense. In their view, Lockdown Mode is a specialized tool for a narrow group of high-risk users rather than a default setting for the general public.
For people who do fall into that high-risk category, the trade-offs can look very different. Journalists handling sensitive documents, human-rights workers operating in hostile environments, lawyers with vulnerable clients, or political dissidents may decide that the friction is a fair price for sharply reducing the chance of a remote compromise. Guides such as the TechRadar explainer on the FBI raid and Lockdown Mode and other reputable analyses of Lockdown Mode suggest that anyone in that position should at least understand how the feature works and how to enable or disable it. In the Natanson case, the simple fact that the reporter had switched it on before the raid appears to have made the difference between a phone that investigators could search and one they could not.
More from Morning Overview
*This article was researched with the help of AI, with human editors creating the final content.
