Russia’s State Duma has approved legislation allowing specialized private security organizations to obtain combat firearms and ammunition from Rosgvardia, the national guard service, for use in countering drones at protected sites. The legislation, adopted in its second and third readings, would expand the private security sector’s role in defending factories, energy infrastructure, and other facilities against Ukrainian drone strikes. The move suggests Russia is looking to supplement state resources for protecting a vast industrial base, shifting more responsibility to commercial guard firms with expanded access to firearms.
Parliament Arms Private Guards Against Drones
The law passed by the State Duma grants specialized private guard organizations, known in Russia by the acronym ChOP, the right to receive combat small arms and ammunition from Rosgvardia’s territorial branches. These weapons are specifically authorized for countering unmanned systems at sites subject to mandatory protection requirements. The scope of the law covers energy-sector facilities, transport infrastructure, and other sites classified as critical to the national economy.
State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin framed the bill as urgent during earlier deliberations, and co-author Vasily Piskarev argued that the legislation addresses specific vulnerabilities in the fuel and energy complex, according to reporting by RIA. The weapons are to be issued for defined periods rather than permanently, a detail that suggests the Kremlin wants to maintain some control over an armed private security force operating across Russian territory. Still, the practical effect is clear: private guards at oil refineries, power plants, and logistics hubs could be temporarily issued rifles intended for anti-drone duty.
The new rules apply only to organizations that meet Rosgvardia’s criteria for “specialized” security, a designation that generally includes firms already entrusted with high-risk sites. In practice, this creates a tiered system in which some guards remain limited to non-lethal equipment while others can be temporarily armed with military-grade firearms. The national guard will control both the issuance and return of these weapons, reinforcing its position as the central authority overseeing the rapidly expanding private security ecosystem.
Why Factories Cannot Wait for the Military
The legislative push did not emerge in a vacuum. Ukrainian drone attacks have been hitting deeper into Russian territory for more than two years, and the country’s industrial sector has been scrambling to respond. As early as spring 2024, Russian manufacturers were turning to local defenses against aerial threats, driven by the reality that military air-defense units could not be stationed at every vulnerable plant or depot.
That gap between threat and protection has only widened. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu warned, according to TASS as cited by coverage from Reuters, that Ukraine’s drone development means no region of Russia can feel safe. Coming from one of the most senior figures in Russia’s security establishment, that assessment amounts to an admission that the state’s own defense apparatus cannot guarantee protection for civilian infrastructure across the country’s eleven time zones.
For factory managers and energy executives, the calculus is straightforward. Waiting for a military air-defense battery to be assigned to their facility is not a viable option when drones can strike refineries, chemical plants, or electrical substations with little warning. Hiring a private security firm that can now legally carry firearms and attempt to intercept low-flying drones offers at least a partial stopgap, even if the effectiveness of small arms against fast-moving unmanned aircraft remains an open question.
In this environment, the new law functions as an official endorsement of measures that many enterprises were already improvising. Companies that previously invested in spotters, sirens, and basic jamming equipment can now integrate armed response into their protection plans. The expectation in Moscow appears to be that a denser patchwork of local defenses will complicate Ukrainian targeting and reduce the number of successful strikes, even if it does not eliminate the threat.
Rosgvardia Tightens Its Grip on Private Security
Arming private guards is only half the equation. The Russian government has been simultaneously tightening oversight of the private security sector, apparently concerned that handing out weapons without accountability could create new risks. Rosgvardia has proposed fining private security companies for inaccurate reporting, and the agency is pushing for mandatory notifications and the provision of contracts related to critical infrastructure protection, as detailed by Vedomosti last autumn.
Explanatory materials accompanying those regulatory proposals argue that the measures are necessary to prevent drone attacks on elements of the economy deemed critical. The combination of expanded firepower and stricter reporting requirements reveals a tension at the heart of the policy: Moscow needs private firms to fill a defense gap but does not fully trust them to do so responsibly without close supervision. The fines for unreliable reporting suggest that some ChOPs have already been cutting corners on their obligations, a problem that becomes far more serious once those same firms are carrying combat weapons.
Rosgvardia’s expanded role also consolidates its institutional power. The national guard now stands at the intersection of three key domains: oversight of private security licensing, distribution and control of firearms for anti-drone missions, and enforcement of new reporting rules tied to critical infrastructure. This gives the agency leverage not only over security practices, but also over lucrative contracts in the energy and industrial sectors, where compliance with national guard regulations will increasingly determine who is allowed to guard what.
Outsourcing Defense Carries Real Risks
The decision to arm private security firms against drones raises questions that go beyond logistics. Russia has long relied on a mix of state and non-state security actors, and arming private guards can raise familiar concerns about coordination, chains of command, and accountability. While ChOPs guarding factories are a different category from battlefield mercenaries, the principle of delegating lethal force to non-state actors carries inherent complications.
One immediate concern is whether small arms fire can meaningfully counter modern drones. Many of the unmanned systems used in the conflict are small, fast, and difficult to hit with rifles. Electronic jamming and purpose-built anti-drone systems tend to be far more effective than gunfire. The law may give factory guards a sense of agency, but it could also create a false sense of security if the actual interception rate proves low. At worst, stray rounds fired at drones over populated or industrial areas could cause collateral damage.
A second risk involves coordination. If thousands of private security posts across Russia are independently engaging aerial targets, the potential for friendly-fire incidents or interference with military air-defense operations grows. No publicly available government audit or institutional study has assessed how ChOP anti-drone fire would integrate with Rosgvardia or military operations, leaving open questions about communication channels, rules of engagement, and identification of friend or foe. In the chaos of an attack involving multiple drones and overlapping defenses, misjudgments could have serious consequences.
There is also the issue of accountability. When a state soldier misuses a weapon, there is at least a formal chain of command and a military justice system to investigate. With private guards, responsibility is divided between the employer, the licensing authority, and law-enforcement bodies. Determining who answers for a mistaken shot at a civilian aircraft, or for negligent handling of firearms on industrial premises, may prove contentious. The new law does not eliminate these gray areas; it merely overlays them with a pressing security imperative.
A Stopgap Measure With Long-Term Implications
Supporters of the legislation argue that Russia cannot afford to leave its factories and refineries exposed while waiting for more sophisticated defenses to be deployed. In their view, arming trained guards is a pragmatic response to an evolving threat, especially when combined with tighter oversight from Rosgvardia. The law, they say, simply allows those already tasked with protecting critical sites to respond to aerial attacks with more than binoculars and radios.
Critics, however, warn that the policy entrenches a fragmented security model built on thousands of separate private actors, each with its own training standards, corporate incentives, and tolerance for risk. Even if the immediate goal is to deter or disrupt drone strikes, embedding armed ChOPs more deeply into Russia’s security architecture could prove difficult to reverse once the conflict environment changes. Weapons systems, reporting rules, and contract relationships created under emergency conditions have a way of becoming permanent.
For now, the new law underscores a broader reality: the front line of the war has moved far beyond the battlefield, into the refineries, power stations, and industrial plants that sustain Russia’s economy. By turning private security guards into a quasi-militarized layer of air defense, Moscow is acknowledging both the scale of the drone threat and the limits of its own armed forces. Whether this experiment in outsourced protection can deliver real security without spawning new dangers will become clear only as the next waves of drones arrive.
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*This article was researched with the help of AI, with human editors creating the final content.
