China’s leaders are no longer content to react to the world as they find it. They are quietly building the tools to shape what people see, hear, and even believe about global power, security, and values, from social media feeds in Missouri to human rights hearings in New York. A new wave of official and independent reporting shows how this effort stretches far beyond propaganda, combining information control, economic leverage, and military expansion into a single, long-term project to tilt the international system toward Beijing’s interests.
What emerges is not a single plot but a dense web of influence operations, industrial choke points, and institutional maneuvers that often remain invisible to the public. I see a pattern in which the People’s Republic of China uses every available channel, from TikTok accounts posing as U.S. voters to obscure nongovernmental groups at the United Nations, to normalize its narratives and constrain its critics while it builds up hard power at home.
The strategy: controlling the story before the facts
At the core of Beijing’s global push is a simple idea: if you can shape the information environment, you can shape political choices without firing a shot. A detailed assessment from the United States government describes how the People’s Republic of China is working to influence media, technology platforms, and political discourse worldwide so that foreign audiences see its rise as benign and its governance model as effective. The report argues that this is not just about public relations, but about creating an ecosystem in which criticism of the Chinese Communist Party is marginalized and narratives that favor its geopolitical goals are amplified, a pattern that aligns with what I see in multiple regions.
Officials in Washington frame this as a systematic campaign to bend the “global information environment” toward Beijing’s preferences, warning that the effort is designed to make other countries’ political and security decisions more accommodating to Chinese power. One fact sheet explains that Today, the Department of State is treating this as a strategic challenge, not a series of isolated incidents, because the same tactics appear in debates over technology standards, human rights, and even pandemic accountability. In my view, the most striking feature is how early Beijing tries to intervene in the life cycle of a story, often before facts are fully known, so that its preferred framing becomes the default.
Inside the new report: a blueprint for narrative dominance
The most comprehensive recent analysis of this campaign lays out how Chinese state organs, party-linked media, and proxy actors coordinate to influence foreign audiences. The executive summary of that assessment starts from a principle that “Every” country has a right to tell its story, but it quickly adds that “However” that story should be grounded in truth rather than coercion or manipulation. The authors argue that Beijing crosses that line by using censorship, disinformation, and economic pressure to silence critics abroad while presenting a curated image of stability and prosperity at home, a dual track that I see echoed in case studies from Asia, Europe, and North America.
What stands out to me is the level of institutionalization. The report describes how party agencies map foreign media ecosystems, identify key influencers, and then deploy tailored content and incentives to bring them into alignment with Chinese talking points. A dedicated special report on how the People’s Republic of China seeks to reshape the global information environment explains that this is not ad hoc, but a long-term project to normalize Beijing’s positions on issues like Taiwan, Xinjiang, and global governance, and it warns that “EXECUTIVE” level coordination in Beijing is driving the “SUMMARY” of these efforts across regions. That same document notes that Every country should be able to speak, “However” the methods now in play risk eroding the very idea of a shared factual baseline in international debate.
From missiles to minerals: hard power behind the soft sell
Information dominance is only one pillar of Beijing’s strategy, and it is backed by a rapid expansion of hard power that gives those narratives teeth. Satellite imagery and procurement records show that China is dramatically scaling up its missile production capacity, a shift that analysts describe as “a new arms race” because it could allow Beijing to sustain high-intensity conflict for longer than many rivals. The same investigation notes that this surge in output is happening just as the United States grapples with its own “supply struggles,” a contrast that underscores how industrial capacity is becoming a central front in strategic competition.
In parallel, Beijing is tightening its grip on critical materials that underpin modern technology, from advanced semiconductors to renewable energy systems. One analysis warns that “The Issue” is no longer limited to rare earth elements, because China is increasingly weaponizing its control over metals like gallium as a “key tool of economic warfare,” using export restrictions and licensing rules to pressure foreign governments and firms. I read this as a deliberate attempt to create leverage points that can be activated in a crisis, allowing Beijing to punish countries that defy its political red lines without resorting to open conflict. The combination of missile factories revealed in Photo Illustra and mineral choke points described in China suggests that Beijing is building a toolkit that blends military and economic coercion behind its public messaging.
Weaponizing supply chains: gallium, rare earths and beyond
Control over supply chains gives Beijing a quiet but potent way to influence other states’ choices, and gallium has become a revealing case study. According to detailed research, China dominates global production of this metal, which is essential for high-performance chips, radar systems, and some renewable technologies. The same analysis notes that “The Issue” is not just market share, but the way Beijing has begun to use export controls and licensing as a “key tool of economic warfare,” signaling that access to gallium and related materials can be conditioned on political behavior.
In practice, this means that governments weighing decisions on issues like Taiwan, human rights, or technology alliances must now factor in the risk that Beijing could disrupt their industrial base. I see this as part of a broader pattern in which Chinese authorities identify strategic bottlenecks, invest heavily to dominate them, and then quietly remind foreign counterparts of that dependence in diplomatic conversations. A public discussion titled “Rare Earths Are Just One of Them: China’s Hidden” influence over critical materials, captured in a video that begins with “Nov” in its transcript, underscores how gallium is only one piece of a larger puzzle of resource leverage. That conversation, available at Nov, reinforces the idea that Beijing’s economic statecraft is designed not only to generate profit but to shape the strategic environment in its favor.
Influence at the U.N.: puppet NGOs and silenced critics
While supply chains and missiles operate in the background, Beijing is also working in the open halls of international organizations to reshape norms and mute criticism. At the United Nations, investigators have documented how Chinese authorities support a network of so-called “government-organized nongovernmental organizations,” or GONGOs, that present themselves as independent civil society groups. In reality, these entities often function as proxies that echo official positions, occupy speaking slots, and monitor genuine activists who challenge Beijing on issues like Tibet, Xinjiang, or Hong Kong.
One investigation describes how, “At the” U.N., “China” is deploying a growing army of such puppet organizations to “Human Rights” forums, where they can file complaints against dissidents, applaud Chinese policies, and sometimes even photograph or follow critics in ways that feel intimidating. From my perspective, this tactic serves two purposes at once: it crowds out authentic voices that might sway undecided diplomats, and it sends a message to Chinese activists abroad that they are never fully beyond the state’s reach. The detailed account of these practices, which shows how GONGOs are used to “monitor and intimidate Human Rights activists,” is laid out in an investigation accessible through At the, and it illustrates how institutional rules can be bent to serve a state’s domestic security agenda.
Digital frontlines: fake voters, state narratives and local targets
The same impulse to control narratives is increasingly visible in the digital sphere, where Chinese-linked operations have been caught impersonating ordinary citizens. Researchers who track online influence campaigns found that “China” has used networks of fake accounts on platforms like TikTok and X to pose as U.S. voters, pushing divisive political messages that exploit existing social fractures. The operation, described as “Chinese” in origin, did not simply praise Beijing, but instead tried to deepen polarization on issues such as race, public health, and foreign policy, which I see as a way to weaken democratic resilience and distract attention from China’s own actions.
These tactics are no longer confined to national politics. In Missouri, the state’s attorney general became the target of a wave of social media attacks after he announced a 24 billion dollar judgment related to COVID-19, a move that drew intense international scrutiny. Analysts later determined that the posts were not organic outrage but “Instead” a coordinated campaign “China and” likely originating from abroad, using fake accounts with “randomly generated account handles” to flood the conversation with pro-Beijing talking points and personal smears. The detailed breakdown of this episode, which shows how local officials can become collateral targets in global information contests, is available through Instead. A separate investigation into how China used “Chinese” influence networks to impersonate U.S. voters underscores that these are not one-off experiments but part of a sustained digital strategy.
Disinformation after conflict: testing the boundaries of truth
Beijing’s information operations are not limited to domestic or Western politics; they also extend into sensitive regional crises where narratives can shape diplomatic outcomes. After a conflict between India and Pakistan earlier this year, a new U.S. assessment concluded that “China” initiated a disinformation campaign that sought to cast doubt on Washington’s role and intentions. According to that report, Chinese-linked channels amplified misleading or false claims about U.S. military movements and diplomatic contacts, apparently aiming to erode trust in American security commitments and present Beijing as a more reliable partner in South Asia.
What I find notable is how quickly these narratives appeared and how they blended with genuine local grievances, making them harder to debunk. The assessment, discussed in a briefing that begins with “Nov” in its transcript, suggests that Chinese strategists see post-conflict information vacuums as opportunities to insert their preferred storylines before facts are fully established. That briefing, available at Nov, frames the episode as part of a broader pattern in which Beijing uses disinformation to test red lines and gauge how far it can go without provoking a strong international response. In my view, this kind of experimentation is especially worrying because it targets the fragile trust that underpins crisis management between nuclear-armed states.
Diplomacy with sharp edges: influence, coercion and corruption
Behind these specific cases lies a more structural shift in how Beijing practices diplomacy. A major study of “CHINESE INFLUENCE OPERATIONS” describes how “Diplomacy” has become a central vector for projecting power, with “Beijing” focusing on two main aspects: influence over international organizations and norms, and the use of tools like economic pressure, coercion, and even corruption to shape foreign elites’ decisions. Rather than relying solely on formal negotiations, Chinese officials are portrayed as working through a dense network of party-to-party ties, business associations, and cultural exchanges that can be activated to reward friends and punish critics.
I see this as a form of “sharp power,” where the outward trappings of soft power, such as cultural institutes or development projects, are combined with behind-the-scenes leverage. The same study notes that these methods are used to “strengthen its influence” in ways that often remain opaque to the public, especially in countries with weak transparency rules. The detailed description of how “Diplomacy” is intertwined with coercion and corruption is laid out in a report accessible through Diplomacy, which emphasizes that “Beijing” is not just seeking goodwill but concrete policy shifts on issues like technology standards, human rights votes, and security alignments.
The counterplay: transparency, resilience and competing models
As Beijing’s efforts become more visible, other governments are starting to respond with their own strategies to protect the integrity of information and institutions. In Washington, the Department of State has begun publishing detailed accounts of how the People’s Republic of China seeks to reshape the global information environment, including a lengthy PDF that spells out tactics ranging from content manipulation to pressure on foreign media owners. That document, which repeats the principle that “Every” country has a right to tell its story but insists that “However” those stories must not be built on coercion, is available as a public resource at Every. I see this kind of transparency as a first line of defense, because it helps journalists, civil society, and ordinary citizens recognize patterns that might otherwise seem like isolated anomalies.
There is also a quieter contest underway over which model of global engagement will define the next decade. While Beijing uses influence operations and economic leverage to expand its footprint, the United States is trying to highlight its own contributions to international security and humanitarian goals, such as its role in landmine clearance and conventional weapons destruction. A recent report on U.S. global leadership in this area, published by the Department of State, notes that the “United States Department of State” maintains a page titled “To Walk the Earth” in Safety to track these efforts. In my view, the contrast between a model that leans on coercive influence and one that emphasizes public goods like demining will shape how smaller states judge the legitimacy of competing great powers, and whether they see alignment with Beijing as a path to security or a new form of dependency.
Why the hidden campaign matters for everyday politics
For many citizens, talk of global information environments and critical minerals can feel abstract, but the consequences are already filtering into daily life. When fake accounts posing as neighbors or fellow voters push extreme content into social feeds, they are not just distorting a distant geopolitical contest; they are changing how communities talk about school board races, public health measures, or local court decisions. The Missouri case, where a state official’s 24 billion dollar COVID-19 judgment triggered a coordinated online backlash linked to foreign actors, shows how quickly a global narrative battle can land in a single U.S. county’s news cycle.
At the same time, decisions made in Beijing about gallium exports or missile production capacity can affect everything from the price of consumer electronics to the credibility of security guarantees that underpin regional peace. When I look across the evidence, from the “How the People” and “Republic of China Seeks” documents that map out Beijing’s information ambitions, to the “Reshape the Global Information Environment” fact sheets that warn of their implications, I see a coherent strategy that treats perception, economics, and force as parts of a single toolkit. The challenge for democracies is to respond in ways that protect open debate without mirroring the very tactics they criticize, a balance that will define whether the next phase of globalization is shaped by transparency and consent or by the quiet pressure of hidden campaigns. In that sense, the new reporting is less a revelation than a mirror, forcing governments and citizens alike to decide how much of their political reality they are willing to outsource to unseen hands.
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