Two senior U.S. lawmakers are demanding a federal investigation into Autel Energy, a Chinese-linked electric vehicle charging company with hardware deployed across the United States, including California. Senator Marsha Blackburn, a Republican from Tennessee, and Representative John Moolenaar, a Republican from Michigan, warn that the company’s chargers could give Beijing access to driver data and critical power grid infrastructure. Their push arrives as federal regulators tighten restrictions on Chinese-connected technology, and California races to expand its charging network.
Lawmakers Target Autel Energy Over Grid and Data Risks
The concern is specific and personal for anyone who plugs in an EV at a public station. Modern chargers are networked devices that process payment credentials, log vehicle identification numbers, record charging session timestamps, and in some cases communicate directly with utility systems to manage load. When the hardware and software behind those functions are built by a company with ties to China, U.S. officials worry that data could flow to a foreign government. Blackburn and Moolenaar allege that Autel Energy’s U.S.-deployed chargers may provide access to consumer data and critical grid infrastructure, a risk they say is amplified by the firm’s corporate overlap with Autel Robotics, a sister entity previously targeted by U.S. restrictions lists.
That overlap matters because it suggests a pattern rather than an isolated case. Autel Robotics, a drone manufacturer, was flagged by U.S. authorities over national security concerns before the EV charging question arose. The lawmakers’ letter argues that Autel Energy inherits the same risk profile (a company subject to the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China operating hardware that touches sensitive American systems). No public response from Autel Energy to the senators’ allegations has surfaced in the available reporting, and no independent lab analysis of the company’s charger firmware has been published. That gap between accusation and evidence is worth watching closely, because the policy response is already moving faster than the technical proof.
Federal Rules Now Treat Connected Tech as a Security Threat
Washington has been building a regulatory wall around Chinese-connected technology for years, and it now extends well beyond smartphones and social media. The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a rule. Effective March 17, 2025, it restricts the import and sale of certain connected vehicles and related hardware and software linked to China or Russia. The rule rests on a direct national security theory: firms subject to PRC jurisdiction could be compelled to provide data or remote access to Chinese authorities. While the BIS rule focuses on connected vehicles rather than standalone chargers, its logic applies to any networked device in the automotive ecosystem that collects location, identity, or behavioral data.
The Biden administration laid the groundwork for this posture. On February 29, 2024, the U.S. launched a formal investigation into Chinese vehicles over security risks, and the Associated Press reported that the probe centered on the idea that Chinese-origin connected systems can gather sensitive information and potentially track individuals. The Federal Register notice for the BIS rule makes the supply-chain concern explicit: the problem is not just data theft but the possibility of remote interference with vehicle systems. EV chargers sit at the edge of that same supply chain, communicating with cars, cloud servers, and power grids simultaneously, and the same vulnerabilities that worry regulators in vehicles could, in theory, be exploited through compromised charging hardware.
Cybersecurity Clauses Aim to Close the Gap
Federal agencies have not left the charging sector entirely unguarded. The Joint Office of Energy and Transportation, a partnership between the U.S. Department of Transportation and the U.S. Department of Energy, publishes model cybersecurity clauses designed to be inserted directly into contracts for EV service providers. These provisions translate the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure program’s privacy and cybersecurity requirements into enforceable terms. One key principle is data minimization: limiting personal data collection to what is strictly necessary. Another requires that data be protected through its entire lifecycle, from the moment a driver taps a payment card to the point the session record is archived or deleted, with clear obligations for encryption, access control, and breach notification.
The regulatory framework under 23 CFR Part 680 sets the floor for these protections, covering privacy, cybersecurity, and interoperability standards for federally funded chargers. But a floor is not a ceiling. The current rules tell charger operators what data practices to follow. They do not ban specific foreign vendors outright or require that firmware originate from particular jurisdictions. That distinction is where the Autel Energy debate gets complicated. A charger can comply with every federal data-handling clause and still run code developed by a company that, under Chinese law, could be ordered to share information with Beijing. The procurement clauses are a necessary defense, but critics like Blackburn and Moolenaar argue they are not sufficient when the hardware itself is the vulnerability and the ultimate control over software updates may rest overseas.
Trade Enforcement Tools Add Pressure on Chinese Tech
Beyond sector-specific rules, the federal government has broader trade and export-control tools that can shape how Chinese-connected technology enters the U.S. market. The Department of Commerce oversees BIS and can restrict certain foreign-made products if they are deemed a national security risk, including by placing companies on entity lists or imposing licensing requirements. Those mechanisms have been used in the past against telecommunications and drone manufacturers, and lawmakers pressing for an Autel Energy probe are effectively asking regulators to consider whether similar steps are warranted for EV charging infrastructure tied to China.
Compliance and enforcement increasingly run through digital portals that track sensitive technology transactions. BIS operates the Secure Network Application for Processing Requests, known as SNAP-R, which companies use to submit export license applications and other filings related to controlled items. Public information about licensing decisions and regulatory actions is available through the agency’s searchable STELA database, giving industry and policymakers a window into how national security concerns translate into concrete restrictions. If investigators ultimately conclude that Autel Energy’s chargers pose unacceptable risks, any resulting controls or designations would likely be reflected in these Commerce Department systems, signaling to manufacturers and utilities that certain equipment is effectively off-limits.
California’s Rapid Buildout Raises the Stakes
California’s position as the largest EV market in the country makes this debate especially consequential for the state’s drivers. The push to install thousands of public chargers along highways and in urban centers means procurement decisions made now will shape the infrastructure Californians depend on for years. State and local agencies are under pressure to deploy hardware quickly to meet climate and air-quality goals, but security advocates warn that speed should not come at the expense of vetting vendors. If Chinese-manufactured chargers are embedded across the network before national security reviews catch up, replacing them later would be expensive and disruptive, much like earlier efforts to strip high-risk telecom equipment from rural networks.
The tension here is not abstract. Every EV charger installed in a public location becomes a fixed data collection point tied to a geographic coordinate. Over time, aggregated session logs from a network of chargers could reveal commuting patterns, travel habits, and even the movements of specific vehicles. For high-profile individuals or sensitive facilities, that pattern-of-life information could be especially valuable. California regulators must therefore weigh the benefits of low-cost, readily available hardware against the possibility that a foreign government could exploit that data or, in a worst-case scenario, use networked chargers as a foothold to disrupt local power systems. As Washington’s scrutiny of Chinese-connected technologies intensifies, the state’s choices on vendors like Autel Energy will help determine whether its charging buildout becomes a model of secure deployment or a case study in the long-term costs of short-term savings.
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*This article was researched with the help of AI, with human editors creating the final content.
