Global Positioning System signals are so deeply woven into daily life that most people never notice them, until they fail. Yet the same weak radio whispers that guide airliners, container ships, ride-hailing apps, and stock trades can be drowned out with equipment that fits in a backpack, and adversaries from Russia to criminal gangs have learned how to exploit that fragility. Scientists, militaries, and startups are now racing to harden navigation and timing, chasing fixes that range from smarter antennas to quantum sensors and new constellations of satellites closer to Earth.
I see a clear pattern in that work: no single technology will “fix” GPS vulnerability on its own. Instead, the emerging answer is a layered ecosystem of resilient signals, from Low Earth Orbit satellites and terrestrial beacons to anti-jam hardware and quantum devices that can navigate without any external radio at all.
Why GPS is so easy to knock offline
The core weakness of the Global Positioning System is baked into its physics. Current GPS satellites operate from medium-Earth orbit at about 25,000 kilometers altitude, so by the time their signals reach the ground they are far weaker than the noise floor of the radio spectrum. A cheap jammer on a truck roof or a handheld transmitter on a city street can overpower that faint broadcast across a wide area, leaving aircraft, ships, and smartphones suddenly blind. Because the satellites sit in MEO, they also follow predictable paths, which makes it easier for attackers to design targeted interference.
Those physics explain why Russia has been able to disrupt the Global Positioning System around conflict zones, airports, and ports, and why Western militaries now treat GPS denial as a baseline threat rather than an edge case. Reporting on how Russia spoofs and jams navigation shows that civilian airliners and merchant ships can be lured off course or forced to revert to older procedures. The vulnerability of Current GPS satellites in MEO has prompted a push for stronger alternatives that either transmit more powerful signals, operate in different orbits, or avoid radio altogether.
Jamming, spoofing, and the quiet rise in interference
Jamming is only one side of the problem. Spoofing, where an attacker sends fake GPS-like signals to mislead receivers, can be even more insidious because the victim may not realize anything is wrong. Analysts tracking interference have seen an uptick in suspicious outages and anomalies, and the pattern of disruptions indicates that there is often “something fishy” when aircraft or ships suddenly lose lock on satellites in contested regions. One detailed account of GPS interference notes that the uptick indicates that there is something fishy when receivers see abrupt changes or gaps, a sign that there’s something fishy in the radio environment rather than a benign glitch.
Experts stress that there are many ways to interfere with GPS, from brute-force noise to sophisticated spoofing that slowly drifts a target off course so alarms do not trigger. One analysis puts it bluntly, noting that “There are many ways to” attack the signal and that even consumer-grade gear can cause pilots or drivers to see their position jump or drift as the interference turns on and off in their GPS signal. That warning, captured in a discussion of how there are many ways to mess with receivers, underlines why aviation regulators, shipping companies, and telecom operators now treat interference as a systemic risk rather than a niche concern.
Low Earth Orbit: bringing navigation closer and louder
One of the most promising fixes scientists and engineers are chasing is to move some navigation and timing services into Low Earth Orbit. Many of the most demanding applications, from Earth observation satellites to crewed spacecraft, already rely on GPS signals in Low Earth Orbit, and research has shown that Many of these missions are LEO operations where receivers have an unobstructed line of sight to multiple satellites. That same geometry can be flipped: instead of only listening to MEO GPS from LEO, new constellations in Low Earth Orbit can broadcast their own positioning, navigation, and timing signals down to the ground at much higher power.
Because the satellites orbit Earth on a much closer orbit, the signal is more than 30 dB stronger at the surface, which makes it more resistant to jamming and interference. One operational system described in a technical overview notes that Because the satellites fly closer to Earth, their timing service is already being used to make time sensitive networks more resilient. That same logic underpins a wave of LEO-PNT projects that aim to augment or back up GPS with louder, more agile signals that are harder to overpower.
ESA’s Celeste and the global LEO-PNT race
Europe is moving aggressively into this space. The European Space Agency has confirmed that the first two satellites in its Low Earth Orbit positioning, navigation, and timing demonstrator, known as Celeste, are set to launch by the end of the year. In one program update, The European Space Agency, or ESA, confirms that the launch of the first two LEO-PNT satellites is planned from the second half of the year, with the pair expected to be in orbit by the end of this year, as part of a broader effort to test how LEO PNT can bolster resilience. A separate briefing on the mission notes that The European Space Agency (ESA) has framed Celeste as a way to explore how Low Earth Orbit can support both civilian and governmental users who need robust timing.
Industry coverage of the program adds more detail, explaining that The European Space Agency (ESA) is preparing to launch the first two Celeste satellites into LEO as a demonstrator mission, with a December launch window targeted to kick off the campaign. That report, which describes how ESA wants to test new signals and user equipment, underscores that Celeste is not just a science experiment but a pathfinder for operational services that could one day complement Galileo and GPS. By putting hardware into Low Earth Orbit, The European Space Agency is betting that closer, stronger signals will be a central part of the fix.
Space Force, TrustPoint, and a new commercial ecosystem
The United States is taking a different but complementary route, leaning on both the military and startups. A detailed account of how the Space Force is boosting an ecosystem of GPS alternatives in Low Earth Orbit describes a strategy to seed multiple constellations that can augment or back up GPS. In that vision, Space Force Boosting an Ecosystem of GPS Alternatives in Low, Earth Orbit is not about replacing the legacy system overnight but about creating a diverse set of signals and services that can survive jamming, including commercial offerings that can be turned on for military users in a crisis. The report notes that the goal is to have multiple providers in LEO that can augment or back up GPS rather than a single monolithic replacement.
One of the most visible players in that ecosystem is TrustPoint, a startup that has already put three spacecraft into orbit and secured five federal contracts in 2024 and 2025, totaling around several tens of millions of dollars. Reporting on the company notes that so far, TrustPoint has launched three spacecraft and has gotten five federal contracts in 2024 and 2025, totaling around a significant sum, as it builds a commercial LEO navigation service that can offer encrypted, high-integrity signals to both government and private customers. That same coverage explains that these services are meant to be independent of, but interoperable with, GPS, giving users a second source of truth when the primary system is degraded, and it highlights how TrustPoint is part of a broader shift toward commercial space-based PNT.
Terrestrial beacons and the Delft experiment
Not every fix involves more satellites. Some scientists are looking back toward Earth and asking whether ground-based transmitters can provide a robust backup when space is contested. A striking demonstration from researchers at Delft University of Technology and VU University in the Netherlands showed how radio transmitters on Earth can be used to do the same things GPS satellites do in space. In that setup, as described in a technical narrative, the scientists at Delft University of Technology and VU University in the Netherlands used synchronized terrestrial beacons to create a local navigation grid, proving that the setup, as demonstrated by scientists at the Delft University of Technology and VU University, can mimic satellite geometry without going to orbit.Another analysis of the same concept notes that they use radio transmitters on Earth to do the same things GPS satellites do in space, effectively turning towers or dedicated beacons into a local constellation. That approach, described in a discussion of how They use radio transmitters on Earth, has obvious limits in range but powerful advantages in cities, ports, and critical infrastructure hubs where authorities can control the spectrum. It is harder to jam a dense mesh of local beacons that can adapt power and frequency, and even if satellites are blinded, a port or refinery could keep operating on its own terrestrial navigation grid.
Anti-jam hardware: from CRPAs to civil airliners
While new constellations and beacons are being built, engineers are also trying to make existing GPS receivers much harder to fool. One of the most common techniques is the use of directional antennas or controlled reception pattern antennas, known as CRPAs, which can steer nulls toward jammers and focus gain on legitimate satellites. A technical glossary on anti-jamming explains that One of the most common techniques is to use directional antennas or CRPAs so that the antenna pattern can be shaped to reduce the impact of interference while preserving the strength of the legitimate satellite signal, a method that has already been fielded on high-end military platforms. That description of how One of the the key anti-jam tools works underlines why antenna technology is central to the near-term fix.
Industry is now trying to push those capabilities into civil aviation. Fokker Services Group Unveils GPS Anti-jamming and Anti, Anti, Solution for Civil Aircraft at Dubai Airshow 2025, a system designed to protect airliners from the growing number of satellite navigation interference incidents. In a separate news report, Fokker unveils anti-jamming and anti-spoofing system at Dubai Airshow 2025, explaining that the technology will first be available for civil aircraft and is being marketed amid growing global concern over satellite navigation interference incidents that threaten passengers, crews, and airlines. Together, those accounts show how Fokker Services Group Unveils GPS Anti solutions that had been reserved for fighters and drones are now being adapted for Boeing 737s and Airbus A320s.
Military-grade resilience: Collins Aerospace and APNT
On the defense side, RTX and its subsidiary Collins Aerospace are pushing the state of the art in anti-jam positioning. One report describes how RTX’s Collins Aerospace Demonstrates Latest Development in Anti, Technology, showcasing a system that can maintain navigation in denied and degraded GPS environments by blending multiple sensors and hardened antennas. The demonstration, highlighted in a technical brief, shows that RTX is focusing on both signal processing and hardware to keep military platforms on track even when adversaries flood the spectrum with noise.
Collins Aerospace is also trialing an advanced anti-jam positioning system during Army exercises, part of a broader push toward Assured Positioning, Navigation and Timing, or APNT. Coverage of those trials notes that Collins Aerospace trials advanced anti-jam positioning system during Army exercises, with The APNT solution engineered to provide resilient navigation capabilities for ground vehicles and command systems. The report explains that the system fuses inertial sensors, encrypted signals, and anti-jam antennas so that Army units can maneuver even when GPS is heavily contested, illustrating how Collins Aerospace is turning lab concepts into fielded gear.
Electronic protection techniques and smarter receivers
Hardware is only half the story; signal processing is just as important. Guidance on how to address GPS jamming in high-jamming environments emphasizes electronic protection techniques that can be implemented in receivers and networks. It explains that Electronic protection techniques for GPS jamming include using Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas, adaptive filtering, and time-frequency analysis to detect and mitigate interference, reducing the risk of GPS jamming for critical users such as emergency services or police forces. When the CRPA antennas detect a jammer, the system can steer nulls and apply other techniques to optimize GPS performance, a strategy described in detail in the discussion of how Electronic defenses can be layered on top of physical antennas.
Some of these ideas are already operational in commercial timing networks. A technical overview of resilient time sensitive networks notes that this system is operational and available today and that because the satellites orbit closer to Earth, the signal is more resistant to jamming and interference. That same document, which describes how Because the signal is stronger, shows that combining LEO timing with smart receivers can keep financial networks and power grids synchronized even when traditional GPS is under attack.
Quantum navigation: using physics instead of radio
Beyond radio, researchers are exploring quantum technologies that could let vehicles navigate without any external signal at all. One line of work focuses on quantum magnetic sensing, which measures the subtle variations in Earth’s magnetic field as a kind of fingerprint for location. A detailed analysis of this approach notes that Even more impressively, quantum magnetic sensing has now achieved what researchers call a “quantum advantage” in navigation, meaning it can outperform classical sensors in certain regimes, and that governments have invested 24.4 million $ into early programs. That report, which explains how Even small quantum devices could be mounted on satellites, ships, and even humans, suggests a future where navigation can fall back on the physics of atoms and fields when radio is compromised.
The U.S. military is about to test another quantum approach in space. A mission overview explains that Quantum Alternative To GPS Navigation Will Be Tested On the U.S. military’s X-37B spaceplane, which is launching with a quantum inertial sensor that could one day guide missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond without relying on external signals. In a nutshell, the experiment will see whether a quantum inertial sensor can maintain precise navigation over long periods, a capability that would be invaluable in GPS-denied environments and deep space. The description of this Nutshell test underscores how seriously defense planners take the prospect of radio-independent navigation.
From conference stages to contracts: quantum’s path to reality
Quantum navigation is still early, but it is moving quickly from theory to prototypes. At a recent Q2B Tokyo event, a speaker framed the moment bluntly, saying that because I believe we’re going to be able to change the way we’ve spoken about quantum technology from all the talks that have focused on distant promises to more concrete deployments. That sentiment, captured in the session titled “Orienteering for the quantum age: Delivering,” reflects a growing confidence that quantum sensors and clocks will soon be rugged enough for real-world use, a shift that was evident in the Jun conference discussion.
Governments are already weaving these ideas into broader navigation strategies. An analysis of how the U.S. and allies are searching for novel ways to navigate notes that the variety of magnetic fields on Earth could be used as a map for satellites, ships, and on humans, and that quantum devices are central to that vision. That same report, which details how The variety of magnetic fields can serve as a navigation aid, makes clear that quantum is not a silver bullet but a powerful layer in a multi-technology stack designed to reduce dependence on any single vulnerable system.
Commercial LEO timing and the TrustPoint–Hexagon partnership
Back in Low Earth Orbit, commercial players are stitching together partnerships to turn experimental satellites into full-fledged services. Earlier this year, TrustPoint announced the successful launch and first contact of its third satellite, Time Flies, part of a growing LEO constellation designed to deliver secure PNT. A detailed account of the company’s strategy notes that Earlier this year, it announced the successful launch and first contact of its third satellite, Time Flies, and that it has teamed up with Hexagon NovAtel in a C-band LEO PNT collaboration to integrate space signals with high-end receivers for today’s military operations. That collaboration, described in the context of how Earlier this year the company reached a key milestone, shows how startups and established navigation firms are aligning around LEO timing.
Europe is pursuing a similar commercial path alongside ESA’s Celeste mission. An ESA update notes that The European Space Agency (ESA) confirms the launch of the first two LEO-PNT satellites is planned from the second half of the year, with the pair expected to be in orbit by the end of this year, and that the agency is working with industry to test user equipment and services. That same document, which emphasizes that The European Space Agency wants Celeste to be a bridge to commercial offerings, suggests that in the coming decade, users may subscribe to multiple LEO timing services the way they now buy connectivity from different mobile networks.
The fix will be layered, not singular
Looking across these efforts, I see a clear pattern: the fix scientists and engineers are chasing is not a single replacement for GPS but a layered architecture. Low Earth Orbit constellations like Celeste and TrustPoint’s Time Flies promise stronger, more agile signals that are harder to jam. Terrestrial beacons, as demonstrated by Delft University of Technology and VU University in the Netherlands, can provide local navigation grids when space is contested. Anti-jam antennas and electronic protection techniques, from CRPAs to advanced filtering, are being pushed into both military platforms and civil airliners, as shown by Fokker’s systems and Collins Aerospace’s APNT trials.
On top of that, quantum sensors and magnetic navigation offer a path to operate even when all radio is denied, turning Earth’s own fields and the physics of atoms into a map. The Space Force’s push to boost an ecosystem of GPS alternatives in Low, Earth Orbit, the European Space Agency’s Celeste demonstrator, and commercial collaborations like TrustPoint and Hexagon NovAtel’s C-band LEO PNT project all point toward a future where no single failure can take navigation down. GPS can indeed be jammed easily, but the fix that is emerging is a resilient web of signals and sensors that, together, make it much harder for any adversary to turn the lights out.
Supporting sources: Fokker to unveil anti-jamming and anti-spoofing system at Dubai.
More from MorningOverview