Federal authorities arrested a 65-year-old former U.S. Air Force pilot on charges that he conspired to train Chinese military aviators in combat aircraft tactics, a case that exposes how retired American fighter pilots can become a direct pipeline of sensitive know-how to adversary air forces. Gerald Eddie Brown, Jr., known by his call sign “Runner,” faces a criminal complaint alleging he violated the Arms Export Control Act by providing unauthorized defense services to pilots of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force. The arrest, announced on February 25, 2026, comes as the Justice Department steps up enforcement against individuals accused of funneling military expertise and secrets to Beijing, treating operational experience as a strategic resource that can be illicitly exported even without a single classified document changing hands.
Prosecutors say Brown’s case illustrates a modern twist on traditional espionage: instead of stealing blueprints or schematics, foreign governments can simply hire the people who once used those systems in combat. By allegedly agreeing to train PLAAF aviators, Brown is accused of offering access not just to technical knowledge of aircraft performance, but to the mindset and tactics that underpin U.S. air superiority. As the Pentagon publicly identifies China as its primary long-term competitor, the case underscores how the line between legitimate post-service consulting and illegal defense services can blur, and how some retirees may be willing to cross it for money or a chance to get back into the cockpit.
What Brown Allegedly Did and Why It Matters
The criminal complaint charges Brown with providing and conspiring to provide unauthorized “defense services” to Chinese military pilots, a category under the Arms Export Control Act that includes training, tactical advice, and other instruction related to U.S.-origin defense articles. According to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Washington, Brown allegedly worked with intermediaries to arrange training for PLAAF aviators, despite knowing that such work required advance authorization from the State Department. The complaint describes a retired aviator actively marketing his skills to a foreign military force that U.S. officials routinely describe as a central strategic challenge.
Court documents cite communications in which Brown repeatedly voiced his eagerness to return to teaching combat aviation. In one message highlighted by the Justice Department, he wrote that he wanted to “train and instruct fighter pilots again!”, a goal that, prosecutors allege, he pursued on behalf of Chinese forces rather than allied air arms or approved foreign partners. Under the AECA, that distinction is decisive: providing defense services to a foreign military without a license is a crime even if no classified material is explicitly transmitted. By bringing charges centered on training and advice, the government is signaling that intangible expertise can be just as sensitive as hardware or software, and that veterans who export that expertise without permission may face serious criminal exposure.
The Su Bin Connection and Stolen Fighter Secrets
Brown’s alleged activities did not occur in a vacuum; they intersect with an earlier case involving Chinese national Stephen Su Bin, who has already appeared in U.S. court for targeting American defense technology. Su Bin pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiring with others in China to hack U.S. defense contractors and steal sensitive military information, including export-controlled data on advanced fighter programs. That prosecution laid bare how Chinese actors sought to obtain detailed design information on American aircraft, using cyber operations to close the technological gap with the United States.
The Brown complaint suggests that this earlier cyber espionage campaign may have been complemented by efforts to acquire human expertise. Prosecutors allege that Su Bin helped facilitate Brown’s potential role as a trainer, effectively moving from stealing documents to brokering access to a real U.S. combat pilot. If accurate, that combination (illicit technical data paired with instruction from someone who has flown cutting-edge fighters) would give a foreign air force more than just blueprints. It would offer insight into how American pilots interpret sensor data, prioritize threats, and make split-second decisions in a dogfight, knowledge that is notoriously difficult to reverse-engineer from stolen files alone.
A Broader Crackdown on Military Leaks to Beijing
Brown’s arrest fits into a wider pattern of Justice Department cases aimed at alleged Chinese efforts to recruit people with U.S. military access. In a separate prosecution, two active-duty Navy sailors were charged with transmitting military information to contacts tied to the People’s Republic of China. Those cases, involving service members identified in court documents as Wei and Zhao, center on accusations that they provided operational details, photos, and technical data about U.S. naval operations and systems in exchange for payments from Chinese intelligence-linked handlers.
While the Navy prosecutions focus on document and data transfers, Brown’s case highlights a different vector of vulnerability: the export of skills and judgment accumulated over decades of flying. Law enforcement can monitor classified networks for unusual downloads or suspicious communications, but tracking the post-service consulting work of retired aviators is far more challenging. The Brown complaint suggests that adversaries are not limiting themselves to recruiting insiders with current clearances; they are also targeting those who have left uniform but still carry a lifetime of tactical knowledge in their heads. Together, these cases point to a multipronged strategy in which Chinese actors court both active personnel and veterans to piece together a comprehensive picture of U.S. capabilities.
Why Retired Pilots Are a Unique Security Risk
Concerns about Brown’s alleged conduct are magnified by his background as a former F-35 pilot, a community that operates one of the most sophisticated fighter aircraft in the world. As reported by international wire services, U.S. officials view pilots with experience in next-generation jets as especially sensitive because they understand not only flight characteristics but also the integrated tactics, sensor fusion, and data-sharing concepts that define modern air combat. That kind of operational insight cannot be easily obtained through hacking alone, making human sources with such backgrounds particularly attractive to foreign militaries seeking to emulate U.S. methods.
Retired pilots also occupy a gray zone in the national security ecosystem. They often retain deep professional networks and may continue to work as contractors, instructors, or advisors for defense firms and foreign partners. In legitimate contexts, that post-service work helps allied air forces learn to operate U.S.-made aircraft under formal government-to-government agreements. But the same skills can be repurposed if a veteran chooses to work for an unauthorized client. The Brown case underscores how the legal framework treats this kind of training as an export subject to licensing, even when the “product” is intangible know-how. It raises difficult policy questions about how to warn, monitor, and, when necessary, deter former service members from engaging in work that could strengthen the capabilities of potential adversaries.
Implications for Export Controls and Veteran Oversight
Beyond the immediate allegations, the Brown prosecution is likely to fuel debates over whether existing export control and counterintelligence tools are adequate for an era in which expertise itself is a tradable commodity. The AECA and related regulations were designed to govern the flow of weapons, components, and technical data, but they also encompass services such as training and tactical instruction. Brown’s case brings that often-overlooked category to the forefront, illustrating how violations can occur even when no physical equipment crosses borders. For policymakers, it may prompt a reassessment of how clearly these rules are communicated to departing service members, particularly those with rare skills tied to sensitive platforms.
At the same time, the case highlights the practical limits of oversight. The U.S. government cannot easily track every consulting offer made to thousands of retired pilots and other specialists scattered across the globe. Overly intrusive monitoring of veterans’ careers would raise civil liberties concerns and could discourage legitimate international cooperation with allies. The challenge, then, is to refine guidance, strengthen vetting for foreign training opportunities, and ensure that former personnel understand when they must seek export licenses or decline lucrative but risky contracts. As Brown’s alleged conduct moves through the courts, it will serve as a test of how aggressively prosecutors are willing to enforce the notion that human experience, no less than hardware or software, is a controlled defense asset when foreign militaries are involved.
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*This article was researched with the help of AI, with human editors creating the final content.
