Morning Overview

China’s J-10 fighter jet may quietly rewrite power in the Indo-Pacific

China’s J-10C fighter jet has moved from trade-show curiosity to combat-tested export product in less than five years, and the shift is forcing defense planners across the Indo-Pacific to reconsider where they buy their next generation of warplanes. Pakistan deployed the aircraft in its May 2025 clashes with India, while Indonesia has openly weighed a large purchase that would mark its first major non-Western fighter acquisition. Together, those developments signal that Beijing’s push into the fighter-export market is no longer theoretical.

For China, the J-10C is more than a single aircraft program: it is a test case for whether the country can translate decades of investment in its aviation industry into durable political and military influence abroad. For Washington and its allies, the jet’s emergence as a realistic option for partner air forces threatens to erode long-standing advantages in training, logistics, and interoperability. The result is a regional arms competition that is no longer defined solely by U.S. and European manufacturers, but by how quickly Beijing can turn interest in the J-10C into signed contracts and long-term support arrangements.

Pakistan’s Combat Claims Put the J-10C on the Map

During fighting between India and Pakistan in May 2025, Islamabad claimed its pilots used J-10C jets armed with PL-15 beyond-visual-range missiles to shoot down Indian aircraft. Pakistan’s foreign minister told lawmakers it was the J-10C that achieved the intercepts, a statement that turned the jet into the most talked-about Chinese weapons platform of the year. No independent forensic verification of the claimed shoot-downs has been published, and India has not confirmed the losses. Still, the assertion alone gave Beijing something it had never had before: a credible, if unverified, combat record for a frontline export fighter.

The broader effect is commercial. Analysis of the episode found that Pakistan’s use of J-10C jets and PL-15 missiles exposed the potency of Chinese weaponry to prospective buyers who had previously treated Western platforms as the only serious option. For countries that face U.S. export restrictions or long delivery timelines for American and European jets, a Chinese alternative with a claimed combat pedigree changes the calculus. The risk for Washington is that each new sale chips away at the interoperability that binds U.S.-aligned air forces together, replacing common supply chains and training pipelines with Chinese equivalents.

Pentagon Data Shows an Export Pipeline Already in Motion

The combat claims did not emerge in a vacuum. According to the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2025 China Military Power Report, China has delivered 20 J-10C units to Pakistan since 2020, with total orders reaching 36 aircraft. That delivery pace, roughly four jets per year on average, suggests a production line scaled for export rather than a one-off diplomatic gesture. The same report flagged interest from additional countries, indicating that Beijing views the J-10C as a tool for expanding its defense relationships well beyond its traditional partner in Islamabad.

China has also invested in soft-power showcasing. The PLA’s Bayi Aerobatic Team switched to J-10C fighter jets and flew them at the LIMA airshow in Langkawi, Malaysia, putting the aircraft in front of Southeast Asian defense officials and media. Aerobatic displays are a standard sales tactic in the fighter market, and the decision to bring the J-10C to a major regional show rather than keep it behind closed doors reflects confidence that the platform can compete on visibility, not just price. For regional militaries that rarely see Chinese aircraft up close, such performances help normalize the idea of operating Chinese hardware alongside or instead of Western systems.

Indonesia’s On-Again, Off-Again Interest

No prospective deal has drawn more attention, or more contradictory signals, than Indonesia’s. According to reporting by The Associated Press, Jakarta planned to buy 42 fighter jets from China, a purchase that would represent its first major non-Western aircraft acquisition. Analysis by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore argued that the potential deal shows China has become a credible alternative defense supplier for Indonesia, which has long struggled with Western arms embargoes and conditional sales. For Beijing, securing such a contract would be a symbolic breakthrough, demonstrating that a major Southeast Asian state is willing to entrust its air defense to Chinese technology.

Yet the procurement status has shifted repeatedly. Indonesian Defense Ministry spokesperson Brig. Gen. Frega Wenas Inkiriwang has said the J-10 purchase plan is still being studied and that Indonesia wants “the best” platforms, language that leaves room for multiple suppliers. By October 2025, Indonesia’s defense minister went further, describing the situation as “window shopping,” according to comments reported by Bloomberg, and walking back earlier remarks that J-10s would be “flying over Jakarta soon.” The gap between those statements and the initial 42-jet figure suggests that domestic politics, alliance management, and technical evaluation are all pulling the decision in different directions simultaneously.

Jakarta’s Balancing Act and Regional Signaling

Indonesian officers have tried to present the J-10C talks as part of a broader diversification strategy rather than a pivot away from Western partners. Maj. Gen. Freddy Ardianzah stated that the plan would not affect Indonesia’s military relations with other countries, reiterating the country’s longstanding “free and active” foreign policy. That message is aimed as much at Washington and Canberra as at domestic audiences, signaling that any Chinese fighter purchase would sit alongside, not replace, cooperation with existing partners. It also underscores how Jakarta sees arms procurement as one more arena in which to hedge between competing great powers.

The ambiguity serves Indonesia’s interests. By keeping the J-10C under consideration without committing, Jakarta can extract better terms from all suitors, including technology transfer and local industrial participation. At the same time, the public nature of the flirtation with Chinese hardware sends a message to Western capitals that Indonesian needs for modern fighters are urgent and that delays or restrictive conditions could drive it toward Beijing. For China, even this limbo has value: the more its aircraft are discussed as a realistic option in Southeast Asia, the more it normalizes the idea of Chinese-origin fighters operating in the airspace of key regional states.

A New Competitive Landscape for Indo-Pacific Airpower

Taken together, Pakistan’s combat claims, the Pentagon’s export data, and Indonesia’s deliberations point to a fighter market that is more contested than at any point in the post-Cold War era. The J-10C’s relatively rapid delivery to Pakistan, its high-profile appearances at regional airshows, and its positioning as an alternative for countries frustrated with Western conditions all contribute to a perception that China can now compete across the full spectrum of fighter sales. For U.S. and European manufacturers, that means not only pricing pressure but also the challenge of maintaining a technological and training edge that is visible enough to outweigh the appeal of faster, less politically encumbered Chinese offers.

For smaller and mid-sized air forces in the Indo-Pacific, the emergence of the J-10C as a viable option expands their menu of choices but also complicates long-term planning. Decisions made in the next few years will lock in supply chains, pilot training pipelines, and maintenance ecosystems for decades. Whether Indonesia ultimately buys the J-10C or not, the very fact that it has seriously considered doing so indicates that the era of uncontested Western dominance in regional fighter markets is over. The next phase will be defined by how effectively Beijing can support its exported jets in service, and how convincingly Washington and its allies can argue that alignment with their systems still offers the greater strategic payoff.

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*This article was researched with the help of AI, with human editors creating the final content.