President Trump announced plans for a new “Trump class” of battleships on December 22, 2025, in Palm Beach, Florida, as part of a broader push to rebuild U.S. maritime strength. The announcement arrives against a stark backdrop cited in congressional findings: the United States fields roughly 80 oceangoing vessels in international commerce, while China has more than 5,500 documented vessels. That gap, measured in merchant and commercial shipping rather than pure naval firepower, has become a central concern for lawmakers and defense officials who warn it leaves American supply chains exposed.
The 80-vs.-5,500 Gap Is About Trade, Not Just Warships
The headline comparison between thousands of Chinese ships and fewer than 100 American ones requires context. The figures come from the SHIPS for America Act, a bipartisan Senate bill whose congressional findings state that the U.S. has fewer than 200 oceangoing vessels total and only about 80 engaged in international commerce, compared to more than 5,500 Chinese documented vessels. These numbers describe the merchant marine and commercial fleet, not strictly combat warships. The distinction matters because merchant ships carry fuel, food, ammunition, and equipment that any military operation depends on, and they also move the bulk of U.S. imports and exports in peacetime.
AP reporting notes that Sen. Mark Kelly, a Democrat and former Navy combat pilot, has framed this disparity as a national security vulnerability. During a CSIS discussion announcing the legislation, Kelly warned that the U.S. has only about 80 ships in international commerce compared to more than 5,500 Chinese ships, casting the imbalance as a supply-chain risk that extends well beyond traditional naval competition. If a crisis in the Western Pacific or a blockade in a key strait disrupted shipping, the country with the larger, more diversified merchant fleet would be better positioned to reroute cargoes, sustain allies, and keep its own factories running. In that sense, the merchant fleet is as much an economic deterrent as a logistical tail for the armed forces.
Where the U.S. Navy Actually Stands
On the military side, the picture is less dramatic than the commercial gap but still unfavorable. The U.S. Navy maintained 293 battle force ships as of October 1, 2025, according to the Congressional Research Service. That total includes aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and support vessels and has hovered below 300 for years, even as mission demands in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Middle East have grown. Navy leaders have argued that the current fleet is stretched thin, with ships spending more time at sea and less in maintenance, a pattern that can accelerate wear and reduce readiness over time.
Longer-term planning documents envision a larger fleet. A Congressional Budget Office review of the Navy’s 2025 shipbuilding plan notes that the service has articulated a goal of 381 ships, while the plan itself would grow the force to 390 battle force ships over several decades. Yet those projections depend on future appropriations, stable construction schedules, and the ability of private shipyards to deliver hulls on time and on budget. Past experience with major programs such as new submarines and surface combatants suggests that cost growth and delays are more the rule than the exception, complicating any straightforward path from current numbers to the aspirational totals laid out on paper.
Trump’s Golden Fleet and the Trump-Class Battleship
President Trump’s response has come in two waves. Earlier in his second term, he issued Executive Order 14269, which established a Maritime Action Plan, or MAP, to coordinate federal agencies around rebuilding the shipbuilding industrial base. The directive framed maritime strength as a pillar of national power, linking commercial ship construction, naval modernization, and port infrastructure into a single strategic agenda. The order directs the development of a Maritime Action Plan to coordinate federal efforts aimed at strengthening U.S. maritime and shipbuilding capacity.
The second wave came with the December 22 announcement in Palm Beach. Trump described plans for new battleships as part of what he calls a “Golden Fleet,” naming the vessels the Trump class and presenting them as symbols of renewed American might. Reporting by the New York Times indicates that the concept centers on larger, more heavily armed surface combatants intended to dominate contested seas. The Associated Press has described the Golden Fleet initiative as a signature priority of Trump’s second term, while also noting that the ambitious schedule and advanced technologies involved raise questions about whether the Navy and its contractors can avoid the kinds of overruns and delays that have dogged recent programs.
Industrial Capacity Is the Real Bottleneck
Announcements and executive orders can set direction, but they cannot conjure shipyard workers or steel plate. The gap between ambition and execution is where most naval expansion plans have stalled in recent decades. Major programs already in motion, including new ballistic missile submarines and guided-missile frigates, have encountered cost growth and schedule slips, in part because the small number of U.S. yards capable of building complex warships are operating near capacity. Introducing a new class of large surface combatants into that environment without expanding facilities and training more skilled labor would likely push existing projects further behind, forcing tradeoffs between legacy platforms and new designs.
The administration has acknowledged the scale of the challenge. A White House fact sheet accompanying the Maritime Action Plan underscores that the United States accounts for less than 1 percent of global shipbuilding output, while China produces roughly half of the world’s tonnage and dominates related sectors such as container manufacturing and port crane production. Reversing that imbalance would require sustained public and private investment in new dry docks, fabrication shops, and training pipelines for welders, naval architects, and marine engineers. It would also demand predictable funding from Congress over many years, something that has often been disrupted by shifting priorities, budget caps, and continuing resolutions.
Why the Merchant Fleet Matters as Much as the Warships
Trump’s Golden Fleet rhetoric focuses on powerful new warships, but the strategic vulnerability highlighted in Congress centers on the merchant fleet. The SHIPS for America Act’s findings point out that U.S.-flagged commercial vessels and their crews are essential for moving military cargo in wartime and maintaining trade flows under stress. In a prolonged conflict, the Navy’s combatants cannot operate effectively without a steady stream of fuel, spare parts, and munitions delivered by civilian-crewed tankers and cargo ships. If those ships are scarce, old, or owned by foreign interests, the Pentagon’s ability to surge forces and sustain them overseas is constrained, regardless of how many destroyers or carriers it fields.
The administration’s broader maritime agenda implicitly recognizes this linkage. The Maritime Might portal groups together initiatives on naval modernization, commercial shipbuilding incentives, and port modernization, signaling that the White House views the merchant marine and the Navy as parts of a single ecosystem. Advocates for a larger U.S.-flagged fleet argue that policies such as cargo preferences, long-term charter agreements, and financing support could help American operators compete with heavily subsidized foreign carriers. Critics, however, warn that without careful design, such measures could raise shipping costs for U.S. exporters and importers, complicating efforts to shore up supply-chain resilience while keeping the economy competitive.
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*This article was researched with the help of AI, with human editors creating the final content.
