China is building nuclear-powered submarines faster than the United States, and the gap is widening. A new warning from the Center for Strategic and International Studies highlights how Beijing’s shipbuilding dominance, fueled by deep state investment and military-civil fusion, poses a direct national security risk to the U.S. Navy’s ability to maintain undersea superiority. The problem is not just that China is producing more hulls; it is that America’s own submarine industrial base cannot keep pace with its own stated requirements, let alone match a competitor that treats shipyards as strategic national assets.
Beijing’s Submarine Fleet Is Growing Fast
The Department of Defense projects that China will field around 65 submarines by the mid‑2020s, with the Office of Naval Intelligence assessing that expansion at submarine production yards could allow even higher output in the years ahead. That fleet includes a mix of nuclear-powered attack submarines, ballistic missile submarines, and conventional diesel-electric boats, all of which have seen generational upgrades in quieting technology, weapons systems, and sensor suites over the past decade. The trajectory is clear: Beijing is investing in both quantity and quality, and its centralized industrial model allows it to move faster than a fragmented Western supply chain.
What makes this buildup especially significant is how it fits into a broader pattern of maritime ambition. A recent analysis of Chinese dominance in global shipbuilding warns that the country’s military-civil fusion strategy blurs the line between commercial shipyards and naval production, giving the People’s Liberation Army Navy access to the world’s largest shipbuilding infrastructure. China already produces more commercial vessels than any other country, and that industrial base can be redirected toward military construction with relative ease. The U.S. has no equivalent capacity, leaving Washington to confront a rival whose peacetime commercial advantages can be rapidly translated into wartime naval power.
America’s Submarine Yards Cannot Keep Up
The U.S. Navy has stated that it needs to build one Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine and two Virginia-class attack submarines per year to sustain its force structure. Navy leadership has also outlined a goal of reaching 2.33 Virginia-class boats per year in later production blocks, but those targets remain aspirational. The submarine construction industrial base has not been able to complete two Virginia-class boats per year since about 2019, according to the Congressional Research Service. Since 2022, the actual completion rate has hovered around 1.1 to 1.2 boats per year, a shortfall driven by workforce shortages, supplier bottlenecks, and aging infrastructure at the two yards that build nuclear submarines: General Dynamics Electric Boat in Connecticut and Huntington Ingalls Industries in Virginia.
The Government Accountability Office has documented the scale of the problem in stark terms. Virginia Block V production is running at roughly 60% of the annual goal, and the Columbia-class program, which will replace the aging Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, faces its own schedule delays. Congress provided supplemental funding for the submarine industrial base in fiscal year 2024, but even billions in additional investment have not yet translated into faster delivery timelines. The core constraint is not money alone. It is the physical capacity of shipyards, the pipeline of skilled welders and nuclear-qualified tradespeople, and a supplier network that was allowed to atrophy over decades of post-Cold War drawdowns.
Trade Policy Meets National Security
The production gap has prompted action beyond the Pentagon. The Office of the United States Trade Representative announced a Section 301 investigation targeting what it called China’s unreasonable practices in maritime and shipbuilding, framing Beijing’s subsidies and industrial policies as a burden on U.S. commerce and a threat to long-term industrial resilience. By treating shipyards and logistics networks as part of a strategic contest rather than a purely commercial issue, trade officials are effectively aligning economic policy with defense planning in a way not seen since the late Cold War.
Public feedback has become part of that strategy. The USTR has invited industry, labor, and security experts to submit comments through its online comment portal, seeking detailed evidence on how Chinese shipbuilding policies affect American firms and workers. Those submissions are expected to shape tariff decisions, potential export controls, and incentives for domestic manufacturing. The process underscores that closing the submarine gap is not just about buying more warships; it is about reshaping the broader economic environment in which those ships are designed, financed, and built.
Why the Industrial Base Gap Matters More Than Fleet Size
Much of the public debate focuses on counting hulls, but the more consequential metric is production rate. A navy that can build faster can replace losses, surge capacity during a crisis, and sustain a long-term presence in contested waters. China’s ability to expand output from existing yards gives it a strategic option the U.S. currently lacks. A detailed Congressional Research Service review of U.S. shipbuilding plans ties American delays directly to deep industrial constraints that will take years, not months, to resolve. Even with congressional supplemental funding, the path to two Virginia-class submarines per year remains uncertain, and each schedule slip erodes deterrence in the Western Pacific.
The Navy is pursuing supply chain improvements, workforce development, and advanced manufacturing techniques to close the gap. Additive manufacturing of components, expanded apprenticeship programs at major yards, and multiyear procurement contracts are all intended to give suppliers the confidence to invest in new capacity. Yet these steps must be sustained over a decade or more to rebuild a robust ecosystem of second- and third-tier vendors. Without that depth, even well-funded programs will continue to struggle when a single casting house or electronics supplier falls behind.
Strategic Choices for Congress and the White House
Lawmakers are increasingly framing these industrial challenges as questions of grand strategy. The latest annual report to Congress on U.S.-China competition emphasizes that Beijing’s undersea buildup is part of a broader effort to displace American power in the Indo-Pacific, backed by state-directed finance and a disciplined long-term plan for industrial dominance. In that context, decisions about submarine procurement, shipyard modernization, and export controls are not isolated budget debates; they are elements of a national response to a systemic rival. Congress faces tradeoffs between funding near-term readiness, such as maintenance and operations for existing submarines, and investing in the factories and training pipelines that will determine the fleet’s size in the 2030s and beyond.
The White House has begun to sketch out its own answer. A presidential directive on restoring U.S. maritime strength sets goals for expanding domestic shipyard capacity, encouraging U.S.-flag commercial shipping, and coordinating with allies to diversify supply chains for critical maritime components. The policy logic is straightforward: if the United States cannot build enough submarines and surface combatants to deter China, then trade enforcement, industrial policy, and alliance management become as important as topline defense spending. Whether that agenda succeeds will depend on sustained political will, predictable funding, and the ability of government and industry to treat shipbuilding not as a cyclical business, but as a permanent foundation of national security.
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*This article was researched with the help of AI, with human editors creating the final content.
