
Global power is no longer measured only in aircraft carriers or currency reserves. In 2026, Beijing is testing a different playbook, using institutions, narratives and long term planning to tilt the rules of the game in its favor. Rather than confronting rivals head on, China is trying to embed its preferences into the wiring of global governance itself.
What is emerging is a quieter, procedural form of leverage that reaches from United Nations agencies to energy markets and digital standards. If it succeeds, the result will not be a sudden rupture but a gradual rewriting of how influence works, and who gets to define concepts like security, development and even civilization.
From rule taker to rule shaper
For much of the reform era, Beijing presented itself as a cautious participant in a system largely designed by the United States. That posture is fading. The country that once framed itself as a developing power learning the ropes is now described in official and analytical accounts as a central pole of the international system, with China explicitly seeking a larger say over how global rules are written and enforced. In strategic circles, this shift is often described as a move from “rule taker” to “rule shaper”, and it is increasingly visible in multilateral bodies.
Analysts of great power competition note that, in the multilateral system created and funded by the United States, the absence of a consistent challenger has allowed Beijing to expand its footprint in key institutions. One assessment argues that, “Absent of” a serious rival in some forums, China has steadily increased its influence within the very organizations Washington once dominated. That influence is not only about votes or leadership posts, it is about the language of resolutions, the priorities of development banks and the norms that guide everything from digital governance to peacekeeping mandates.
Multilateralism with Chinese characteristics
Beijing now presents itself as both “beneficiary and advocate” of multilateralism, but the version it promotes is carefully branded. At a recent international forum, officials described China as advancing a vision of global governance through initiatives like the Global Governance Initiative, framed as a response to global turmoil and institutional gridlock. The message is that existing structures are failing to deliver stability and development, and that Chinese proposals can supply new momentum without overturning the entire order.
That pitch is backed by a more detailed blueprint. In an official articulation of the Global Governance Initiative, Beijing sets out goals that include “fully leveraging the roles of diverse stakeholders” and strengthening “Regional” cooperation to pool strength for global governance. The document stresses that the initiative aims to make the international order “more just and equitable” and to better protect the interests of “the small and weak”. It is a deliberate attempt to position Chinese leadership as a corrective to perceived Western dominance, especially in the eyes of developing states that feel sidelined in traditional forums.
Xi’s four global initiatives and the battle of narratives
At the heart of this new power play is a cluster of branded concepts that Chinese officials now reference as a package. Commentators describe China-proposed four global as revealing a clear vision of governance, supplying what are described as institutional and procedural guarantees for a different kind of order. These initiatives are framed as addressing security, development, civilization and governance, and together they amount to a comprehensive pitch for how the world should be organized.
One of the most striking of these is the Global Civilization Initiative. The Global Civilization Initiative, or GCI, is described as an explicit attempt by China to shape global norms based on diversity and respect, rather than on a single liberal template. Earlier analysis of Beijing’s newest global initiatives notes that the GCI, introduced in March 2023, promotes a narrative of civilizational equality that dovetails with principles in the Global Security Initiative. It is a soft power project, but one with hard geopolitical implications, because it challenges the idea that Western liberalism is the default setting for international norms.
Economic statecraft and the 15th Five-Year Plan
Behind the rhetoric sits a dense web of economic planning that gives Beijing tools to turn ideas into leverage. Analysts of the country’s near term outlook note that China in 2026 will remain ambitious, innovative and globally influential, yet also constrained and internally brittle. That tension is shaping the design of the 15th Five-Year Plan, which Chinese leaders see as a way to harden the domestic economy while deepening external influence through trade, technology and infrastructure.
According to one detailed forecast, China is expected in 2026 to implement more proactive macroeconomic policies, committing to accelerate the construction of a new development pattern and to push a green transition to achieve carbon neutrality. Another assessment notes that 2026 marks the start of China’s 15th Five-Year, with policymakers emphasizing technological innovation and manufacturing upgrades, including in infrastructure investment. When Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke on a Tuesday about securing a good start to the Five Year Plan, he linked that effort directly to increasing uncertainty and unpredictable factors in the global environment, underscoring how domestic planning is now framed as part of a broader contest over resilience and influence.
Energy, security and the hard edge of soft power
Energy policy is one of the clearest arenas where this new style of power is taking shape. A close look at 2026 trends describes “The Big Picture” of Chinese energy strategy as a country tightening its internal systems while expanding its reach into global energy markets in the process. Taken together, these moves are designed to reduce vulnerability to external shocks and to increase Beijing’s ability to shape prices, supply chains and standards, from solar panels to electric vehicles.
That economic muscle sits alongside a steady modernization of hard power. A recent assessment of China’s Military Power points to upgraded ground vehicles such as the ZTZ99 tank and hints at “first glimpses of the H20 bomber or whatever that program might develop”. The message is that while Beijing talks the language of multilateralism and shared governance, it is also investing in capabilities that can backstop its diplomatic and economic influence with credible military force, especially in its immediate neighborhood.
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