The next generation of presidential aircraft has slipped further into the future, with the Air Force now targeting the middle of 2028 for the first of Boeing’s heavily modified jets to be ready for service. The revised schedule stretches an already delayed program and raises fresh questions about cost, risk and how long the current Air Force One fleet can safely and reliably stay in front-line use.
Behind the new delivery date is a tangle of industrial setbacks, design changes and political pressure that has turned a marquee contract into a test of Boeing’s ability to execute on its most sensitive government work. I see the latest moves, including a stopgap purchase of used 747-8s from Lufthansa, as a sign that the Air Force is no longer willing to bet everything on the original plan arriving on time.
The new mid‑2028 target and what it really means
The Air Force has now locked in “mid‑2028” as the expected arrival window for the first of the new Boeing Air Force One jets, a significant shift from the earlier goal of having at least one aircraft ready by the middle of this decade. In Washington, officials have framed the updated schedule as a realistic response to persistent production problems, with the Air Force expecting the first delivery of the delayed Boeing Air Force One jets in that mid‑2028 timeframe and the overall program cost rising to just over $4.3 billion, according to detailed program updates from the Air Force. That figure captures not only the aircraft themselves but the extensive modifications that turn a commercial airframe into a hardened flying White House.
Program officials have also acknowledged that the second aircraft may trail the first by a meaningful margin, with internal planning documents indicating that the follow‑on delivery could slip into 2029 if testing, certification or modification work runs long. Reporting on the schedule shift notes that the New Air Force One Delivery Shifts timeline now anticipates the first jet in 2028 and warns that the second could arrive the following year, a scenario that would leave the presidential fleet operating with a mixed inventory for an extended period, as reflected in the Air Force’s own delivery projections. In practical terms, that means the current VC‑25A aircraft will have to shoulder the bulk of presidential travel for longer than originally planned, even as they age further and demand more maintenance.
How far the program has slipped from the original plan
The mid‑2028 target is not just a minor adjustment; it represents a delay of roughly two years compared with the original schedule that envisioned new aircraft entering service around 2026. Earlier Pentagon assessments already flagged that the new Air Force One was running 24 months behind, with a Department of Defense official citing a “combination of factors” including Covid‑19 and supply strains that left the new planes 24 months behind schedule, a blunt assessment captured in a review of the $3.9 billion program. That earlier slippage has now hardened into a new baseline that pushes the first operational use of the jets into the latter half of the decade.
Independent analysts tracking the project have underscored how far expectations have moved. Overviews of When Will the New Air Force One Be Ready note that the original schedule called for the new Air Force One to be delivered in the middle of the decade, but that it is important to note that some of the most complex work, including full mission systems integration, may not be completed until after 2028, according to program summaries on Air Force One timelines. Taken together, the official and outside assessments show a program that has steadily drifted to the right on the calendar, with each new delay compounding the operational and political stakes.
Why Boeing keeps missing the mark
Behind the shifting dates is a manufacturer that has struggled to stabilize its workforce and supply chain on one of its most sensitive projects. Boeing’s Air Force One production is facing continued delays because the manufacturer cannot consistently hire and retain mechanics with the specialized skills required for the VC‑25B modifications, a problem that has been described as a core reason the schedule keeps slipping in internal briefings and in coverage of Boeing’s production challenges. Those staffing gaps ripple through the entire program, from structural work on the airframes to the installation of secure communications and defensive systems.
The company is also juggling the VC‑25B work alongside other high‑profile problems, including quality and safety issues involving its 737 planes that have consumed management attention and engineering resources. Reports on the Boeing VC‑25 program, also known as Air Force One, describe it as a marquee but troubled effort that has been buffeted by the same industrial strains affecting the broader commercial portfolio, including issues involving its 737 planes that have forced the company to divert talent and focus, as detailed in analyses of Boeing’s long‑delayed jets. When I look at the pattern, it is clear that the Air Force One delays are not an isolated misstep but part of a broader struggle inside Boeing to execute complex programs on tight timelines.
Inside the contract: fixed price, rising pressure
The structure of Boeing’s deal with the government has amplified the pressure. The company agreed to a fixed‑price contract to replace Air Force One, a choice that capped what the Air Force would pay but left Boeing exposed to cost overruns as delays mounted. Darlene Costello, the Air Force’s acting assistant secretary for acquisition, technology and logistics, wrote in testimony submitted to lawmakers that the program has been hit by a mix of supplier transition, manpower limitations and wiring design completion issues, a candid description of the hurdles facing the Air Force and its prime contractor that is laid out in her acquisition testimony. Those factors have driven up Boeing’s internal costs even as the government’s price remains largely fixed.
From my vantage point, that dynamic helps explain why the Air Force is now more willing to adjust schedules than to reopen the contract. Officials know that forcing unrealistic timelines on a contractor already absorbing losses could backfire, yet they also have to safeguard the continuity of presidential airlift. The latest program updates, which confirm that the Air Force expects first delivery of the delayed Boeing Air Force One jets in mid‑2028 and that the total cost has risen to just over $4.3 billion, show how the service is trying to balance fiscal discipline with the reality that this is a one‑of‑a‑kind capability, as reflected in the detailed breakdown of program costs. The result is a contract that is financially painful for Boeing but politically difficult to unwind.
Why the Air Force is buying Lufthansa 747‑8s
One of the clearest signs that the Air Force is hedging against further delay is its decision to acquire additional widebody aircraft from the commercial market. The Air Force is purchasing two 747‑8 planes from Lufthansa to support the future Air Force One program, with officials saying the first plane will be delivered early next year and the second is expected to be delivered before the end of 2026, a move that reflects concern about both training capacity and spare parts for the presidential fleet, as outlined in the service’s plan to buy Lufthansa 747‑8s. These aircraft will not be full Air Force One replacements, but they will give crews more flexibility as the VC‑25B program drags on.
Program documents describe the move as part of a broader strategy to shore up the presidential airlift enterprise. Led by prime contractor Boeing, the VC‑25B program is replacing the current fleet of VC‑25A aircraft, dubbed Air Force One when the president is aboard, and the Air Force has now decided to buy two Lufthansa 747‑8s to provide additional capacity and resilience, with the goal of having both in hand before the end of 2026, according to acquisition details on the decision to buy Lufthansa 747s. In parallel, the Air Force Confirms $400 Million Acquisition of Lufthansa Boeing 747‑8s for Presidential Fleet Support, with officials specifying that the service is spending $400 M to secure the two 747 aircraft and integrate them into the broader Presidential Fleet Support plan, a figure highlighted in the announcement of the $400 Million acquisition. I read that as a relatively modest investment to buy down risk on a mission the United States cannot afford to interrupt.
Stopgap presidential airlift and the role of the 747‑8i
The Air Force is not just buying airframes; it is also planning how to use them. The U.S. Air Force plans to purchase two Boeing 747‑8i aircraft from Lufthansa for Presidential Airlift, with officials explaining that the ongoing modifications to the primary VC‑25B aircraft are extensive and that the additional 747 capacity will help cover training, logistics and contingency missions while the main jets are still in work, according to detailed descriptions of the plan to buy Lufthansa 747s for Presidential Airlift. These aircraft are expected to operate in support roles rather than as the president’s primary ride, but they will share enough commonality to ease maintenance and crew transitions.
Additional reporting on the New Air Force One Delivery Shifts timeline notes that the Air Force is explicitly planning to use the ex‑Lufthansa aircraft for training and for spare parts, a recognition that the VC‑25B’s unique systems and structures will require a robust pipeline of components and a steady flow of aircrew experience, as laid out in the service’s explanation that the extra jets will support training and spare parts. In my view, that approach mirrors what airlines do when they buy additional frames to cannibalize for parts, but here the stakes are higher: the goal is to ensure that when the new Air Force One finally arrives, there is a mature ecosystem ready to keep it flying without interruption.
What the delay means for President Trump’s travel
The political dimension of the delay is impossible to ignore, particularly for President Donald Trump, who championed the Air Force One replacement program and pushed for a distinctive livery and a tough fixed‑price deal with Boeing. Analyses of the Trump May Never Fly On New Air Force One As Boeing Delays Delivery To Mid‑2028 scenario point out that the expected delivery date for the first VC‑25B now falls near the end of his current presidential term, raising the real possibility that he may never conduct an official trip on the new aircraft before leaving office, as highlighted in assessments that Trump may never fly on the new jet. That timing undercuts one of the more visible symbols of his influence on the military’s modernization agenda.
At the same time, the delay has direct implications for how long the current VC‑25A aircraft must remain in front‑line service. Coverage of the Delivery of updated Air Force One planes delayed by about a year notes that the schedule slip means the existing jets will continue to serve as the primary presidential transports until at least the late 2020s, with officials acknowledging that the delay now overlaps with the period when Trump’s term ends in January 2029, as detailed in reports on the delivery of updated Air Force One planes. From my perspective, that means the political payoff of the new aircraft, in terms of presidential optics and legacy, may accrue more to Trump’s successor than to the president who drove the original deal.
Security, survivability and why the upgrade still matters
Even with the delays, the rationale for replacing the current Air Force One remains compelling. The new aircraft are designed to incorporate modern communications, defensive systems and hardening against emerging threats that the aging VC‑25A fleet was never built to face. Reports on the New US presidential planes delayed again until 2028 emphasize that the delivery of a new Boeing jet to be used by the US president, famously known as Air Force One, has been delayed once more, but also stress that the aircraft are intended to replace Air Force One with platforms that can better withstand sophisticated attacks and operate in contested environments, as outlined in coverage of the new US presidential planes. That mission profile goes far beyond VIP comfort.
Additional reporting on Trump’s potential absence from the new jets underscores the technical stakes. Analyses of the Trump, Air Force One and Boeing dynamic note that the new aircraft are being built with advanced communications suites and structures that are protected against electromagnetic pulse, a capability that is central to ensuring continuity of government in a crisis and that the current fleet can only partially match, as described in assessments of how the new Air Force One is hardened. From where I sit, that makes the delay more than a scheduling headache; it is a temporary extension of risk in how the United States moves its commander in chief around the world.
How the delay became official policy
The shift to mid‑2028 did not happen in a vacuum; it followed a series of internal reviews and public hints that the schedule was under strain. A U.S. Air Force official has now confirmed that the service has delayed the new Air Force One delivery date until mid‑2028, with the revised target replacing an earlier date of December 2024 that had already become unrealistic, a change that was first detailed when the US delays new Air Force One delivery to mid‑2028 and explained that the new window reflects updated assessments of modification and testing timelines, as captured in the Air Force’s confirmation of the new date. That public acknowledgment effectively reset expectations across the Pentagon and Capitol Hill.
Financial analysts quickly folded the new schedule into their outlook for Boeing. Summaries of how Boeing delays delivery of Air Force One jet to mid‑2028 note that the Air Force announced the revised target after internal reviews showed that the previous plan was no longer tenable, and that the change to mid‑2028, as Reuters reports, has become the baseline scenario for investors tracking Boeing’s top stocks and government exposure, as reflected in market‑focused coverage of Boeing’s delay to mid‑2028. In my assessment, once the Air Force and financial markets both internalize a new date, it becomes very difficult for the company to accelerate meaningfully without a major shift in resources.
What comes next for Boeing, the Air Force and the presidency
Looking ahead, the Air Force and Boeing now have a narrow path: stabilize production, complete the complex modifications and bring the first VC‑25B into service by mid‑2028 without further slippage. The Air Force has already signaled that it expects first delivery of the delayed Boeing Air Force One jets in that window and is aligning training, logistics and support infrastructure accordingly, as detailed in its planning for the mid‑2028 arrival. Success will depend not only on Boeing’s ability to fix its workforce and supply issues but also on the Air Force’s willingness to make timely decisions on testing and certification.
For the presidency, the stakes are both symbolic and practical. The current VC‑25A aircraft will likely carry President Trump through most, if not all, of his term, while the new jets may debut under a different administration that will inherit both the benefits and the political baggage of a program that has run late and over its original expectations. Coverage of Boeing, Air Force One and Reuters reporting on the delays has already framed the saga as a case study in how ambitious defense programs can falter when industrial realities collide with political timelines, as seen in the broader narrative around US delays to mid‑2028. From my vantage point, the new delivery date is less a finish line than a test of whether Boeing and the Air Force can restore confidence in one of the most visible symbols of American power.
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