Russia’s RS-28 Sarmat, better known in NATO circles as “Satan II,” was sold as a planet-scorching superweapon that would cement Moscow’s nuclear dominance for decades. Instead, a string of spectacular test failures has turned the billion‑dollar flagship into a case study in how prestige projects can buckle under technical strain and geopolitical pressure. The latest mid‑launch explosion, the fifth serious flop in a troubled series, raises hard questions about whether the Kremlin can actually field the missile it has spent years hyping.
Rather than reinforcing Russia’s deterrent, the repeated breakdowns are exposing the limits of its defense industry at a moment when the war in Ukraine and confrontation with the West are already stretching resources. I see a widening gap between the image of unstoppable “Satan II” that President Vladimir Putin has cultivated and the reality of a program that keeps blowing up on the pad or failing in flight.
The latest explosion that shattered the myth
The most recent test of the RS-28 Sarmat did not just underperform, it reportedly disintegrated almost as soon as it left the silo. According to accounts of the launch, the intercontinental ballistic missile rose for only a few seconds before breaking apart and crashing back near the site, a failure so visible that it was quickly framed as a major setback for Putin’s prized system. One report described how the projectile climbed for roughly seven seconds before falling back toward the ground, a humiliating outcome for a weapon that is supposed to deliver nuclear warheads across continents, and that same account noted that Draft summonses were being handed out at Russian airports as the state scrambled to sustain its broader war effort.
Another detailed description of the incident said Russia’s “Satan II” intercontinental ballistic missile exploded during takeoff, with debris raining down near the launch complex and forcing local authorities to cordon off the area. That account, written by Antonia Langford, stressed that the weapon was meant to threaten targets in the US and Europe, yet it failed before it could even clear the immediate vicinity of the pad. When a missile that is supposed to be the crown jewel of Russia’s strategic arsenal cannot survive its own launch sequence, the credibility gap is impossible to ignore.
A pattern of failure, not a one‑off mishap
What makes this latest disaster so damaging is that it fits into a clear pattern rather than standing out as an unlucky anomaly. Analysts tracking the RS-28 Sarmat program have noted that, so far, what is unique about the missile is not its range or payload but its repeated inability to complete tests successfully. One technical assessment pointed out that the first full‑scale test flight from an underground silo in northern Russia ended in failure, and that subsequent attempts have been marred by similar problems, leading to the blunt conclusion that Sarmat is distinguished mainly by its propensity for failure.
Independent imagery and open‑source intelligence have reinforced that picture. Earlier analysis of satellite photos showed that Russia’s new Sarmat missile suffered a major test failure, with debris and scorch marks indicating that the vehicle did not complete its planned trajectory. Researchers reviewing those Images concluded that the event was a failed test, contradicting any attempt to spin it as a controlled experiment. When I line up the mid‑launch explosion, the aborted full‑scale flight, and the satellite‑confirmed mishap, the story that emerges is of a program struggling to get even the basics right.
How “Satan II” was supposed to change the nuclear game
On paper, the RS-28 Sarmat is designed to be a trump card in Russia’s nuclear posture, a heavy intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying multiple warheads and advanced decoys to overwhelm missile defenses. Russian officials have repeatedly framed it as a response to Western missile shield projects and as a symbol of Moscow’s technological prowess. One detailed profile of the system described how the RS-28 “Sarmat” was meant to be a trump card that stays in the sleeve, highlighting a launch from Plesetsk in the Arkhangelsk region that was presented as a successful demonstration of its capabilities, even as the same analysis cataloged a series of doubts under the heading Doubts Cloud Sarmat Testing Record and noted that Plesetsk and Arkhangelsk are central to the program’s test infrastructure.
President Putin has leaned heavily into that narrative, publicly promising that Russia would soon deploy the RS-28 Sarmat as part of a broader modernization of its strategic forces. In one statement, he confirmed plans to deploy the missile and cast the move as Russia’s next major step in nuclear modernization amid ongoing tensions with the West, saying it would strengthen the country’s strategic deterrent. That pledge was tied directly to the idea that Russia is locked in a long‑term confrontation with the West and needs cutting‑edge systems to keep pace. The more the Kremlin has talked up Sarmat as a game‑changer, however, the more glaring its real‑world performance problems have become.
Why the test site and schedule matter
The geography and timing of the Sarmat program help explain why the failures are so politically sensitive. Work on the main test site began after the winter thaw, with engineers racing to prepare silos and support infrastructure in harsh northern conditions. One analyst, Etienne Marcuz, wrote that “Work there began in Spring 2025, after the ice thawed,” and noted that the long‑term future of the site, which has roots going back to 2014, remains highly uncertain. When a program is racing seasonal deadlines and operating in remote terrain, technical shortcuts and schedule pressure can easily creep in.
Those constraints are compounded by the political calendar and the war in Ukraine, which have both incentivized the Kremlin to showcase progress even if the hardware is not ready. A detailed account of the most recent failure described how the missile meant to strike fear in Russia’s enemies failed once again, underscoring that One of Vladimir Putin’s favorite sabres to rattle is not living up to its billing. When I look at the compressed construction timeline, the harsh environment, and the political imperative to produce a showpiece, the repeated malfunctions start to look less like bad luck and more like the predictable outcome of a rushed, over‑promised project.
Old Soviet hardware filling the gap
While Sarmat stumbles, Russia is leaning on older systems that were never meant to carry the full weight of its twenty‑first century deterrent. Analysts have pointed out that Russia has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal but is having trouble getting its newest intercontinental ballistic missile into reliable service, which leaves it dependent on missiles that first entered service in 1988 and are now considered inferior by modern standards. One assessment put it bluntly, saying that Russia is struggling to get Sarmat working and is therefore stuck with older and inferior missiles that were designed in the late Soviet period.
The latest explosion has also drawn attention to the broader state of Russia’s intercontinental ballistic missile fleet. A recent report on a failed long‑range missile test described how a Russian intercontinental ballistic missile suffered a mid‑launch explosion, with key points emphasizing that the incident highlighted ongoing reliability issues and forced the military to keep relying on certain Soviet‑designed missile systems. That account, published by NewsArmy, underscored that the failure was not an isolated glitch but part of a pattern that is keeping legacy hardware in frontline service. In strategic terms, every Sarmat flop effectively extends the life of missiles that Russia itself has labeled as outdated.
What satellite sleuths and OSINT say about the record
Open‑source intelligence has played a central role in puncturing official narratives about Sarmat’s progress. Analysts poring over commercial satellite imagery from Planet Labs have been able to reconstruct test events in detail, tracking scorch marks, debris fields, and changes at launch sites that reveal what really happened. One such assessment said that, based on satellite imagery of the Planet Labs test site, an OSINT analyst concluded that a key Sarmat test ended in “complete failure,” a judgment that was later echoed by a researcher at the Centre for Geopolitics who told Based on the available evidence that Putin’s much‑feared missile had failed in four out of five tests.
Those findings dovetail with earlier imagery‑based reports that showed Russia’s new Sarmat missile suffering a major test failure, reinforcing the impression that the program’s publicized successes are the exception rather than the rule. When I compare the official claims of smooth launches with the independent record compiled by Planet Labs, OSINT analysts, and researchers, the weight of evidence points to a system that is still far from operational. The fact that Sep imagery could so clearly document a failed test underscores how difficult it is for Moscow to hide setbacks in an era of ubiquitous satellite coverage.
Strategic fallout for Russia and the wider nuclear balance
The immediate impact of Sarmat’s failures is reputational, but the strategic consequences run deeper. Russia has invested heavily in portraying “Satan II” as a weapon that can outfox any missile defense system and guarantee its ability to strike the US and Europe under any circumstances. When the missile instead explodes on takeoff or falters mid‑flight, it undercuts that narrative and raises doubts among both adversaries and allies about the real state of Russia’s nuclear modernization. One detailed account of the latest explosion stressed that Russia intended Satan II to threaten targets in the US and Europe, yet the test failure highlighted how far the system still is from delivering on that promise.
There is also a resource cost that is harder to quantify but no less important. Each failed test represents not only a lost missile but also the strain on engineers, test crews, and industrial suppliers who must rebuild and try again, all while the war in Ukraine consumes manpower and funding. A detailed analysis of the program’s trajectory noted that Nov assessments of Sarmat’s record emphasize its repeated failures rather than any breakthrough achievements, and that reality forces Moscow to keep pouring money into a system that has yet to prove itself. In a nuclear landscape where reliability and predictability are as important as raw destructive power, a flagship missile that keeps blowing up is less a trump card than a liability.
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