The contest between the United States F‑22 Raptor and China’s emerging J‑36 concept is often framed as a simple duel, but the reality is more complicated. One is a fully fielded air‑dominance fighter with a long operational record, the other a still‑evolving Chinese project that appears to blend stealth, range and strike in ways that do not map neatly onto a one‑to‑one comparison. To understand whether the F‑22 is “superior,” I have to look less at slogans and more at roles, technology choices and the strategic problems each aircraft is built to solve.
What the F‑22 actually is, and what the J‑36 appears to be
The F‑22 Raptor is a dedicated air‑superiority fighter, designed from the outset to seize control of the skies by finding and killing enemy aircraft before they can respond. It combines very low observable shaping, powerful sensors and supercruise performance in a platform that has been refined through years of operational use and upgrades. By contrast, the J‑36, as described in open‑source analysis, looks less like a pure dogfighter and more like a stealthy strike and escort platform that borrows from both fighter and bomber lineages, which already complicates any simple “better or worse” verdict.
Several analysts argue that the J‑36 may be closer in spirit to a stealthy deep‑strike aircraft than to a classic air‑dominance jet, with some comparing its notional layout and mission profile to an unrealized American concept sometimes referred to as an FB‑22. That framing suggests Beijing is trying to field a long‑range, low‑observable aircraft that can carry heavier payloads into contested airspace, rather than merely clone the Raptor’s air‑to‑air focus, a point underscored in assessments that describe China’s J‑36 as potentially echoing an American FB‑22 stealth bomber concept.
Stealth, sensors and the problem of seeing first
In any comparison between the F‑22 and a Chinese fifth‑generation design, the first question is which aircraft can detect, track and engage the other at useful ranges. The Raptor’s edge has long rested on its combination of low radar cross‑section and a mature sensor fusion architecture that lets pilots build a coherent picture of the battlespace without giving away their own position. That advantage is not just about raw stealth, it is about how radar, electronic support measures and data links are integrated into a cockpit that has been tested and iterated in real operations.
Chinese programs such as the J‑20 and the projected J‑36 are widely assessed as attempts to close that gap by pairing indigenous low‑observable shaping with increasingly sophisticated radar and infrared search and track systems. Analysts who have compared the F‑22 and F‑35 families to Chinese designs argue that the matchup is no longer a one‑sided contest, particularly as China fields more advanced sensors and networking across its fleet, a point that surfaces in detailed debates over American F‑22/F‑35 vs Chinese J‑20 capabilities. At the same time, U.S. observers note that the Raptor’s sensor suite has benefited from incremental upgrades and combat‑driven software improvements that are difficult to replicate quickly, especially for a platform like the J‑36 that has yet to prove itself in sustained operations.
Air‑to‑air performance and the limits of paper comparisons
On paper, the F‑22 still sets the benchmark for raw air‑to‑air performance, with supercruise, high thrust‑to‑weight ratio and extreme agility at high angles of attack. Those traits are not just about dogfighting theatrics, they matter for missile kinematics, survivability and the ability to dictate engagement geometry. When analysts compare the Raptor to Chinese fifth‑generation fighters, they often conclude that the American jet retains an edge in close‑in maneuvering and energy management, even as newer designs try to match or exceed its performance envelope.
Yet the more I look at expert commentary, the clearer it becomes that modern air combat is less about who can pull tighter turns and more about who can manage signatures, sensors and weapons employment at range. Detailed comparisons of the F‑22 with China’s J‑20, for example, emphasize that both sides are optimizing for long‑range missile engagements supported by offboard sensors, not for classic dogfights, a theme that runs through assessments of which stealth fighter is better. If the J‑36 is indeed tailored for longer‑range strike and escort roles, its designers may be willing to trade some close‑in agility for fuel, payload and sensor aperture, which would make it a different kind of threat than a one‑for‑one Raptor rival.
Mission roles: air dominance versus deep strike
When I weigh “superiority,” I have to start with mission design. The F‑22 was built to kick down the door in contested airspace, clear out enemy fighters and then support follow‑on forces. Its weapons bays, radar and electronic warfare systems are optimized for that job, and its limited production run reflects a focus on quality over quantity. The J‑36, by contrast, appears to be part of a broader Chinese effort to field a family of stealth aircraft that can handle not only air‑to‑air combat but also long‑range strikes against ships, bases and infrastructure across the Western Pacific.
Some open‑source analyses suggest that the J‑36 could be configured to carry heavier internal payloads and operate at longer ranges than a classic fighter, which would make it more comparable to a stealthy bomber or strike fighter than to the Raptor. That interpretation is reinforced by commentary that frames the J‑36 as a platform intended to project power over distance, echoing earlier American thinking about an FB‑22‑style strike aircraft derived from the Raptor’s basic layout. If that is accurate, then the question is not whether the F‑22 is “better” in a vacuum, but whether U.S. and allied forces have the right mix of air‑dominance fighters, stealth bombers and stand‑off weapons to counter a Chinese fleet that blends roles in more flexible ways.
How the J‑36 fits into China’s wider fifth‑generation ecosystem
To understand the J‑36, I have to place it alongside the J‑20 and J‑35, which already anchor China’s fifth‑generation ambitions. The J‑20 is widely seen as a long‑range interceptor and air‑superiority platform, while the J‑35 appears aimed at carrier operations and export markets. The J‑36, if it follows the trajectory sketched in open‑source reporting, would add a stealthy strike and escort capability that complements those existing types rather than replacing them, giving Beijing a more layered and resilient airpower toolkit.
Analysts who track Chinese aviation note that this ecosystem approach is deliberate, with each platform filling a niche in a larger anti‑access and area‑denial strategy that targets U.S. and allied forces across the region. Comparisons that pit the F‑22 against a single Chinese jet risk missing that context, especially when assessments of China’s J‑20 and U.S. F‑35 already highlight how Beijing is pairing its stealth fighters with dense surface‑to‑air missile networks and long‑range anti‑ship weapons. In that environment, a J‑36 configured for deep strike or electronic attack could be as strategically significant as any marginal edge in dogfighting performance, because it would help China complicate U.S. operations across multiple domains at once.
What open‑source analysts actually say about F‑22 vs J‑36
Public commentary that directly compares the F‑22 and J‑36 is still relatively sparse, in part because the Chinese aircraft remains more concept than fully transparent program. Where analysts do weigh in, they tend to stress that the Raptor’s proven stealth and combat systems give it a clear near‑term edge in pure air‑to‑air combat, while cautioning that China’s rapid progress in sensors, networking and missile technology is narrowing the gap. Some assessments distill the matchup into a blunt verdict that the American jet would dominate in a straight fight, but that such a fight is unlikely to occur in isolation from broader force‑on‑force dynamics, a nuance that surfaces in discussions of who wins between the J‑36 and F‑22.
Other open‑source voices focus less on a hypothetical duel and more on how the J‑36 might be used alongside other Chinese assets to stress U.S. defenses. Technical breakdowns that compare the J‑36 and F‑22 often highlight differences in payload, range and likely avionics architecture, arguing that the Chinese design may be optimized for multi‑role flexibility rather than the Raptor’s single‑minded air‑dominance focus, a theme that appears in engineering‑oriented comparisons of aviation giants J‑36 and F‑22. Taken together, these perspectives suggest that while the F‑22 remains the more mature and specialized platform, the J‑36 could still pose a serious challenge if it is fielded in numbers and integrated effectively into China’s wider air and missile forces.
Lessons from F‑22 matchups with J‑20 and J‑35
Because the J‑36 is still emerging, I find it useful to look at how analysts have framed the F‑22’s matchup with other Chinese fifth‑generation jets. Comparisons with the J‑20 often emphasize that the Raptor retains advantages in stealth shaping and close‑in performance, while the Chinese aircraft may enjoy longer range and a larger weapons bay, which could matter in a missile‑centric fight. Those debates underscore that “better” depends heavily on scenario, with some experts arguing that the outcome would hinge on who controls the wider sensor and command‑and‑control network, a point made explicit in detailed looks at F‑22 vs J‑20 engagements.
The emerging J‑35 adds another layer, particularly as a carrier‑capable stealth fighter that could operate from Chinese decks in contested waters. Analyses that pit the F‑22 against the J‑35 tend to stress that the American jet would likely outperform the Chinese design in air‑to‑air combat, but they also warn that the J‑35’s presence at sea could stretch U.S. resources and complicate planning, especially if it is fielded in significant numbers, a concern reflected in assessments of F‑22 vs China’s new J‑35. If the J‑36 joins this mix as a long‑range strike or escort platform, the combined effect could be to dilute the Raptor’s qualitative edge by forcing it to operate in a far more crowded and complex threat environment than the one it was originally designed to dominate.
Why “superiority” now depends on networks, not just jets
When I step back from the platform‑by‑platform comparisons, the most important shift is that airpower is increasingly about networks, not individual aircraft. The F‑22’s greatest strength may no longer be its raw performance, but its integration into a broader U.S. system of satellites, airborne early‑warning aircraft, electronic warfare platforms and surface‑based sensors. That ecosystem allows the Raptor to fight as part of a distributed web of shooters and sensors, rather than as a lone gladiator, a reality that shapes how serious analysts talk about modern air combat.
China is clearly trying to build its own version of that ecosystem, pairing stealth fighters like the J‑20, J‑35 and projected J‑36 with ground‑based radars, long‑range missiles and increasingly capable command‑and‑control networks. Debates over whether the F‑22 is “really superior” to any single Chinese jet risk missing that the decisive factor may be which side can fuse data, allocate targets and manage emissions more effectively across an entire theater. That is why some of the most thoughtful commentary on U.S. and Chinese fifth‑generation matchups focuses less on platform specs and more on how each side is adapting its doctrine and training, a theme that runs through discussions of Raptor‑era assumptions and through community debates on credible defense forums that weigh the full system‑of‑systems matchup.
What I can say with confidence right now
Based on the open sources available, I can say with confidence that the F‑22 remains the more mature and specialized air‑dominance platform, with proven stealth, sensors and performance that no Chinese aircraft has yet demonstrably surpassed in operational use. The J‑36, by contrast, is best understood as an ambitious Chinese effort to field a stealthy, long‑range strike and escort aircraft that complements the J‑20 and J‑35, rather than as a direct Raptor clone. That difference in design intent matters more than any single metric, because it shapes how each aircraft would actually be used in a conflict.
At the same time, it would be misleading to treat the matchup as static or one‑sided. China’s rapid progress in fifth‑generation aviation, its apparent interest in FB‑22‑style concepts and its integration of stealth fighters into a broader anti‑access strategy all point to a future in which the Raptor’s edge is contested across multiple dimensions at once, a trend highlighted in evolving analyses of U.S. and Chinese stealth fleets and in scenario‑driven comparisons of Chinese and American fifth‑generation forces. For now, the F‑22 is still the benchmark in pure air‑to‑air combat, but whether it remains “superior” in any meaningful sense will depend less on its own impressive design than on how quickly both sides adapt their wider networks, tactics and force structures to the realities of a contested Pacific sky.
More from MorningOverview